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FIFTY REPUBLICS AND THE NATIONAL 
POPULAR VOTE:  HOW THE GUARANTEE 
CLAUSE SHOULD PROTECT STATES 
STRIVING FOR EQUAL PROTECTION IN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today’s American representative democracy is a story of epic 
proportion, centuries in the making, told at the expense of countless 
martyrs carrying forth the Promethean torch that lights the way of 
progress.  Revolutionaries, writers, heroes working the Underground 
Railroad, daring statesmen, courageous women, and many others have 
together sacrificed for and contributed to the ideal that is universal 
suffrage.  The Tree of Liberty has borne fruit that can be seen and heard 
throughout the land.  From the Liberty Bell and Lady Liberty to children 
reciting “[L]iberty and justice for all!”, it is our shared belief that “We 
hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that 
they are endowed, by their CREATOR, with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”1  Ours 
is an amazing story because we, the people of the world’s arguably 
greatest nation in all of history, choose our leader.  The leader of not only 
the United States of America, but of the “Free World,” is elected by the 
people!  Maybe the words have been said so often that they have lost 
their full import, but “leader of the free world” is an amazing concept.  
That this position is not filled through divine right, by conquest, or by 
aristocratic appointment is a historical anomaly. 
How amazing the path is that took the world from feudalism and 
monarchy to freedom and this moment, where the people of the United 
States collectively vote, as one people, for the President.  And who is the 
President but the only official that represents the entire American 
people, each and every one of us regardless of gender, color, or place of 
birth; why should we not vote directly for her and have our votes 
counted directly for her?2  Through the outstanding principle of equal 
protection, women and minorities share in making such a monumental 
decision as who their leader will be, something that is nothing less than 
an exercise in personal freedom.  It cannot be said enough—this kind of 
freedom is a historical abnormality! 
                                                 
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
2 See Tom Wicker, Foreword to NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT:  THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE ALTERNATIVE 9, 13 
(1968) (echoing this same sentiment). 
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The only problem is that this story is a bit fictional. 
Through the Constitution, states—not people—reserve the power of 
collectively choosing, by their electoral votes, who will become the 
President.3  For many years, states have chosen through their legislative 
bodies to hold popular statewide elections as the means for determining 
how they will exercise their constitutional prerogative to appoint 
presidential electors.4  However, states are constitutionally free to 
appoint their electors in many ways, including ways that do not include 
elections.  Pursuant to this freedom to choose how to appoint electors, 
some state legislatures have recently decided that the honor of electing 
the only official that represents the entire American people should 
belong to the American people—not the states; these states (six states 
and the District of Columbia with a combined seventy-four electoral 
votes) have ratified the National Popular Vote Agreement (“NPV”).5  
Once enough states have ratified the NPV, they will together appoint all 
of their presidential electors according to which presidential candidate 
wins the national popular vote for president, not who wins their 
respective statewide popular votes.6 
The NPV, by correlating the presidential election to the national 
popular vote, would fundamentally change the political landscape of the 
United States.  Not surprisingly, the NPV has met opposition among 
scholars and within the media.7  One specific critique is that this 
agreement would violate the Compact Clause of the United States 
Constitution.8  A ripe Compact Clause challenge to the NPV, brought 
only after enough states have ratified the NPV, would pit the power the 
Constitution affords states in one clause against the power afforded to 
them in another clause.  This is a fascinating story because these two 
constitutional provisions—the Electoral College of Article II, section one, 
                                                 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
4 See infra text accompanying note 29 (discussing same). 
5 See infra Part II.B (discussing the NPV).  The six states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington.  See 57 D.C. Reg. 9869 (Dec. 24, 2010); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2009); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/1–10 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. 
LAW § 8-5A-01(West 2010); 2010 Mass. Acts Ch. 229; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:36-4 (West Supp. 
2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.300 (West Supp. 2011).  When Mayor Adrian Fenty 
signed bill 18-0769 on October 12, 2010, the District of Columbia became the most recent (at 
the time of this Note’s publication) to pass NPV legislation.  See Washington DC, NAT’L 
POPULAR VOTE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/states.php?s 
=DC. 
6 See infra Part II.B (discussing the NPV). 
7 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing policy and legal arguments 
against the NPV). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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paragraph two and the Compact Clause—have never before been set in 
opposition by adversaries with standing. 
To add intrigue, consider that if congressional approval were 
required per the Compact Clause before states could ratify the NPV, 
states would essentially lose all political control; by taking away the 
power of state legislators to appoint presidential electors in a manner of 
their own choosing, state governments would no longer be accountable 
to their citizens, but to the federal government.  This would violate yet 
another provision lurking in the Constitution, the Guarantee Clause, 
which was ratified in order to prevent, among other perils, 
encroachment by Congress into the sovereignty of the state 
governments.9 
This Note explores the guarantee of republican government 
proffered by the Guarantee Clause in relation to the Compact Clause and 
the plenary power that states exercise when determining how to appoint 
presidential electors.  Part II will explore the history of and explicate the 
current understanding of the Electoral College, the NPV, the Compact 
Clause, and the Guarantee Clause.10  Part III will analyze the interplay of 
the NPV, Article II, and the Compact Clause in contemporary Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.11  The Guarantee Clause has been dormant for 
almost a century, a situation this Note will address in Part IV by 
advocating for the awakening of this “sleeping giant” when and if the 
NPV is challenged under the Compact Clause (or any other clause).12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section explores the history and current perceptions of the 
Electoral College, the NPV, and the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The first Part will explain the mechanics of the Electoral 
College.13  It will then draw attention to some of the methods exercised 
through, as well as the scope of, state legislative power in choosing 
presidential electors.14  Next, this Note examines what the NPV is and 
does and the preeminent challenge to NPV legislation:  the Compact 
                                                 
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
10 See infra Part II (discussing the background of the Electoral College, the NPV, the 
Compact Clause, and the Guarantee Clause). 
11 See infra Part III (discussing the same). 
12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 290 (1972) 
(quoting Charles Sumner); see also infra Part IV (discussing the same). 
13 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing how the Electoral College works). 
14 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing how state legislatures have chosen presidential 
electors). 
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Clause.15  This section concludes with a history of the Guarantee Clause, 
which assures to the states a “Republican Form of Government.”16 
A. “The Electoral College” 
1. Basic Mechanics of the Electoral College 
Although the term electoral college cannot be found in the 
Constitution, the electoral machinery alluded to by the phrase is treated 
by Article II as a power expressly reserved for the states.17  The relevant 
text reads: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of 
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office 
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.18
                                                 
15 See infra Part II.B (discussing the same); infra Part II.C (discussing the same). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the same). 
17 U.S. Electoral College Frequently Asked Questions, ARCHIVES.GOV, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html#history (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2010); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  “Elector,” which is found within the 
Constitution, was a concept borrowed from the Holy Roman Empire to refer to those 
princes who could participate in electing the German king—a person who usually became 
Emperor.  “College” means a group of people acting as a unit.  U.S. Electoral College 
Frequently Asked Questions, supra.  “Electoral College” came into popular use in the early 
1800s and today, “college of electors” can be found in 3 U.S.C. § 4.  Id. 
 An express reservation of power within the National Constitution for state legislatures 
is not rare; there are eleven such grants.  JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL:  A 
STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 292 (2d ed., 
2008).  The other state legislative powers are the following:  “choosing the manner of 
electing U.S. Representatives and U.S. Senators; . . . choosing the manner of conducting a 
popular election to fill a U.S. Senate vacancy; empowering the state’s governor to fill a U.S. 
Senate vacancy temporarily . . . ; consenting to the purchase of enclaves by the federal 
government . . . ; consenting to the formation of new states from territory of existing 
state(s);” and “ratifying a proposed federal constitutional amendment; making an 
application to Congress for a federal constitutional convention; [and] requesting federal 
assistance to quell domestic violence.”  Id. 
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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The Electoral College currently consists of 538 potential members.19  One 
hundred members of the College correlate to the two Senators 
representing each state in Congress, while 435 of its members mirror 
each state’s proportional-to-population representation in the House of 
Representatives.20  An additional three electors are allocated to the 
District of Columbia.21 
                                                 
19 A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, ARCHIVES.GOV, http://www.archives.gov/ 
federal-register/electoral-college/procedural_guide.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).  This 
site is maintained by the National Archivist who has several mandates pursuant to federal 
law regarding the Electoral College.  See 3 U.S.C. §§ 6, 11–13.  The number 538 is 
determined by:  the U.S. Census pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 2a (governing the election of 
Senators and Representatives); 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2006), which says, “[t]he number of electors 
shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the several States 
are by law entitled;” and the Twenty-Third Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (granting 
presidential electives, but not congressional representatives to Washington D.C.). 
 The term “potential” is appropriate as a state could fail to properly appoint its 
electors, resulting in a decrease in the overall number of the College.  See, e.g., McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892) (recounting how the New York legislature did not appoint its 
electors in the first presidential election because it could not agree on how to choose the 
electors).  That the number of electors in the College is only a potential number matters 
because the Twelfth Amendment—and paragraph three of Article II which it superseded—
recognizes as President the candidate with a majority of the votes out of the whole number 
of Electors appointed.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  This means that if all 538 potential electors 
are appointed, then 270 electoral votes are required for a nominee to become President.  Id.  
If no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, then Congress is given the role of 
selecting the President.  Id.  In this event, the House chooses the President through state 
voting whereby each state delegation gets one vote, and the Senate chooses the Vice 
President with each Senator getting a vote.  Id. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2.  Pursuant to the 2000 Census, California had fifty-five 
electors in the 2008 Presidential election while seven states and the District of Columbia 
each had three electors.  Distribution of 2008 Electoral Votes, ARCHIVES.GOV, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2008/allocation.html (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2010).  Congressional representation—the system upon which the number 
of electors is allocated—is a result of the Connecticut Compromise (“the Great 
Compromise”) at the Constitutional Convention between the Virginia Plan (which favored 
representation in Congress based upon population) and the  New Jersey Plan (favored by 
small states wanting equal state representation).  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 34–37, 262. 
 During the National Convention, Southern states were threatened by the prospect of 
being in the minority in both houses; their fears were assuaged by the three-fifths 
compromise which allowed their slave population to contribute to their representation in 
the House without giving slaves the right to vote.  See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 72–74 (1996); see also 
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxvi (highlighting that ninety percent of the slave population 
lived in the South).  Madison said that slavery was the biggest obstacle to direct elections 
for the President.  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 39.  However, the debate about presidential 
elections took place two months after the debate about congressional representation had 
occurred, and the Great Compromise was added only as an afterthought.  Id. at 261–62.  
Small states did not see their true advantage in the Electoral College, which gave them 
proportionally a bigger vote than large states, but instead in the House contingency plan 
triggered when no candidate received a majority of the vote and where each state receives 
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Presidential electors are officers of the state, not the federal 
government.22  The presidential electors are chosen on the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in November, a day commonly perceived as a 
presidential election day.23  On Election Day, citizens of the United States 
do not directly cast votes for President of the United States; instead, they 
are acting in their capacity as agents of their state legislatures—their 
votes are the means by which state legislatures exercise their Article II 
mandate to appoint presidential electors “in such [a] Manner” as they 
may direct.24  The electors who have been appointed by virtue of each 
state’s popular vote on Election Day do not actually vote for President 
until “the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next 
following their appointment;” at that time, the presidential electors 
gather in their respective states to carry out their charge and cast their 
votes for President of the United States.25  After this act, the Electoral 
College ceases to exist until the next presidential election.26  It is not until 
January 6th of the following year at a joint session of Congress that the 
votes cast by the now disbanded electors are actually counted.27  This 
                                                                                                             
only one vote regardless of population.  Id. at 262.  Some Framers believed that most 
presidential elections would end up utilizing the House contingency plan.  See RAKOVE, 
supra, at 90.  James Madison wrote that the Electoral College was “the result of compromise 
between the larger and smaller states, giving to the latter the advantage of selecting a 
President from the candidates, in consideration of the former in selecting the candidates 
from the people.”  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 37. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
22 See Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (holding that a state has jurisdiction 
over an elector for election fraud because an elector is a state official); see also Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (“[P]residential electors are not officers or agents of the federal 
government.”). 
23 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2008, at A1 (announcing the victor of the election by publishing this article on the 
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November 2008 when the votes had yet to be 
officially counted by Congress in January). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 208.02 (West 2009) 
(“Presidential electors shall be chosen at the state general election held in the year 
preceding the expiration of the term of the president of the United States.”).  Colorado is 
the only state that constitutionally mandates that its residents be allowed to vote for 
presidential electors.  KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 57. 
25 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
26 THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20273, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:  HOW 
IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 5 (2003), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28109.pdf. 
27 Id. at 5–6.  The congressional act of counting these votes has been the object of national 
controversy in times past, most notably in the 1876 presidential election between Democrat 
Samuel J. Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes.  See generally PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 
86–92.  In that election cycle, four states sent different sets of elector returns and Congress 
was tasked with deciphering which were legitimate and which were not.  Id. at 88–89.  A 
temporary body—the Electoral Commission—convened to determine the presidential 
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may seem confusing, which highlights the discrepancy between the 
popular conception of a November presidential election and the legal 
nicety holding that the next President is undetermined until January; this 
discrepancy is to most people pedantic, an illustration of form over 
substance.28 
The discrepancy may seem pedantic because all states have for some 
time designated popular elections by state voters, to the exclusion of 
other constitutionally permissible means, as the process for appointing 
electors.29  Forty-eight states use a winner-take-all, or general ticket 
method for these popular elections.30  Under the winner-take-all system, 
a vote for a presidential candidate is actually a vote cast for a slate, or a 
ticket, consisting of a group of candidates for electors that has been 
nominated prior to Election Day, usually by the state political parties.31  
The slate that gets the most votes earns all of the state’s electors.32  
Further, all states make use of a short ballot wherein only the names of 
the presidential candidates and their running mates are revealed, not the 
names of the presidential electors for whom the populace is technically 
casting their ballots.33 
To illustrate the winner-take-all and short ballot, consider the 
following:  A Minnesotan who went to the polls on November 2, 2004 
(November 1 was the first Monday of November) to cast a vote for 
George W. Bush and Dick Cheney filled in a bubble next to “George W. 
Bush and Dick Cheney, Republican” because Minnesota uses a short-
                                                                                                             
winner.  Id. at 89.  In the aftermath, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 was passed in order to 
prevent the same crisis from reoccurring; a provision from this Act, the safe-harbor 
provision, was at the center of the dispute in the 2000 presidential election.  See infra notes 
50–56 and accompanying text (discussing the safe-harbor provision and the 2000 
presidential election). 
28 See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 3 (2006).  As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted, “the vot[e by] the electors is a formality, predetermined by the popular 
vote cast in each state on [election day].”  Id. (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL 
CRISIS:  THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 3 (2004)). 
29 NEALE, supra note 26, at 3.  State legislatures can constitutionally use any number of 
methods to appoint electors.  See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the various methods used). 
30 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 53–54. 
31 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.03–05 (West 2009) (laying out the process by which 
the state’s major political parties nominate their respective presidential electors at state 
conventions prior to election day).  Thus, the presidential slate winner of California’s 
general election would really be an appointment by the California legislature of fifty-five 
electors who have pledged to vote for the Presidential slate winner.  The nomination of the 
electors prior to Election Day is often done during the state’s political party conventions.  
KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 59.  Twenty-nine states nominate electors in like fashion.  Id.  
In six states and the District of Columbia, state party committees nominate the electors, 
while in Pennsylvania the Presidential nominee nominates the potential electors.  Id. 
32 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
33 Id. at 55–56.  The short ballot is exemplified by the Minnesota ballot.  Id. 
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ballot that lists only the presidential candidates’ names, not the names of 
the presidential electors.34  However, that Minnesotan actually cast a 
ballot for George Cable, Jeff Carnes, Ronald Eibensteiner, Angie Erhard, 
Eileen Fiore, Walter Klaus, Michelle Rifenberge, Julie Rosendahl, Lyall 
Schwarzkopf, and Armin Tesch, all of whom together made up the 
Republican “ticket” or “slate.”35  There are ten people named because 
Minnesota has two U.S. Senators and eight Representatives in the House 
for a total of ten possible presidential electors.36  Likewise, each of the 
other presidential candidates on the Minnesota short ballot had ten 
presidential electors for whom Minnesotans where actually voting.  
Because Minnesota uses a winner-take-all system, and because only 
1,346,695 people marked bubbles next to “George W. Bush and Dick 
Cheney, Republican” as opposed to the 1,445,014 people who marked 
bubbles next to “John F. Kerry and John Edwards, Democratic-Farmer-
Labor,” none of the Republican slate of presidential electors were 
actually appointed by Minnesota.37  Instead, on December 13, 2004, ten 
other people who constituted the Democratic-Farmer-Labor slate cast 
their votes for John Kerry and John Edwards.38  These votes were not 
actually seen or counted until January 6, 2005, when a joint session of 
Congress officially counted them.39 
A consequence of the nearly ubiquitous winner-take-all system is the 
confusion and frustration created by the now-televised, unofficial, and 
legally void national popular vote tally for President.40  As the 2000 
presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore illustrated, it 
is possible for a presidential candidate to win the popular vote and still 
lose the presidency.41  Out of fifty-six U.S. presidential elections, only a 
handful ended with divergent results between the popular vote and the 
                                                 
34 Id. at 57–58. 
35 Id. at  58, 66. 
36 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing how states are apportioned their 
number of electors). 
37 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 64–67. 
38 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (explaining the general ticket and short 
ballot). 
39 Supra text accompanying note 27. 
40 See, e.g., David Stout, The 2000 Campaign:  The Electoral College; How Winner of the 
Popular Vote Could Lose After All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/11/03/us/2000-campaign-electoral-college-winner-popular-vote-could-lose-after-
all.html (citing Representative Ray LaHood as saying, “[i]t would be a travesty if the 
winner of the popular vote on Nov. 7 did not become president because of the Electoral 
College”). 
41 See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Polls Show Victory Could Come Without Winning Popular 
Vote, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A1 (quoting law professor Erwin Chemerinsky). 
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Electoral College count.42  More often, there have been “hairbreadth” 
elections in which a strategic shift in less than one percent of the popular 
vote would have changed the outcome in the Electoral College without 
changing the winner of the popular vote.43  Yet, despite its infrequency, 
this kind of result has galvanized some who seek to abolish the Electoral 
College; nearly ten percent of all congressionally proposed amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution have concerned Electoral College reform.44  
Others, recognizing the political challenge of abolishing the Electoral 
College, point with urgency to the benefit of reforming specific aspects of 
                                                 
42 TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY:  THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 168–
69 (2005).  Depending on who is counting, there are only two to four elections with 
different results.  The four presidents who could be characterized as winning the Electoral 
College while losing the popular vote are John Quincy Adams (1824), Rutherford B. Hayes 
(1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), and George W. Bush (2000).  Id. at 168.  Tara Ross argues 
that only the 1888 and 2000 elections can accurately be characterized as elections wherein 
the clear winner of the popular vote lost the presidency.  Id. at 170.  She points out that in 
1824, presidential electors were not chosen by popular elections in many states, but by state 
legislators, and so there is no accurate count of the real national popular vote from that 
election.  Id. at 168.  The 1876 election could be dismissed for similar reasons—in this case 
because elections in the South were not “fair and free.”  Id. at 168–69.  Others see the 1876 
election as a clear example of discrepancy between the popular vote and the Electoral 
College vote.  See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 28, at 209 n.96 (citing to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist).  Robert Bennett also denotes the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon election as a debatable 
example—debatable because it is uncertain who won the popular vote in that election due 
to a combination of how Alabama ballots were configured and a complex political situation 
in Alabama at the time.  Id. 
43 PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 317–21.  In the 1828 election, a shift of 11,517 votes in five states 
would have changed the outcome.  Id. at 318.  In 1836, a shift in 14,061 votes in New York 
would have changed the outcome.  Id.  In 1840, a change in 8386 votes in four states would 
have changed the outcome.  Id.  In 1844, a change of 2555 votes in New York would have 
changed the outcome.  Id.  In 1848, a shift of 3227 votes in three states would have changed 
the outcome.  Id.  In 1856, a shift in 17,427 votes (out of 4,030,137 total votes cast) would 
have changed the outcome.  Id.  In 1860, a shift of 18,050 votes (out of 3,838,290 total votes 
cast) in four states would have changed the outcome.  Id. at 319.  In 1864, a shift of 38,111 
votes (out of a total of 4,024,425 total votes cast) in seven states would have changed the 
outcome.  Id.  In 1868, a change of 29,862 votes in seven states would have altered the 
outcome.  Id.  In 1880, a shift of 10,517 votes in New York would have altered the outcome.  
Id.  In 1884, a shift in 575 votes in New York would have changed the outcome.  Id. at 320.  
In 1892, a change in 37,364 votes in five states would have changed the outcome.  Id.  In 
1896, 20,296 votes in six states would have changed the outcome.  Id.  In 1900, a shift in 
74,755 votes (out of 13,577,988 total votes cast) in seven states would have changed the 
outcome.  Id.  In 1908, a shift in 75,041 votes in eight states would have changed the 
outcome.  Id.  In 1916, a shift of 1983 votes in California would have changed the outcome.  
Id. at 321.  In 1948, a shift in 29,294 votes (out of 46,170,636 total votes cast) in three states 
would have changed the outcome.  Id. 
44 Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate:  The Framers, Federalism, and One Person, 
One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2526 (2001); see also KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 275 
(citing Gallup News Service which indicated between 65% and 81% public support for 
nationwide popular election of the president during the years 1944 to 1980). 
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the Electoral College.45  Calls for reform or constitutional amendments 
are answered by supporters of the Electoral College who maintain that it 
prevents the tyranny of direct democracies, magnifies both minority 
concerns and presidential mandates, encourages national coalition 
building, decreases the possibility of fraud, fortifies the two-party 
                                                 
45 See generally, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 28, at ch. 5–8 (describing the need for reform of 
the contingent procedure for selection of the president by the House of Representatives and 
for the problem of “faithless electors”).  The contingent procedure occurs when a 
presidential candidate receives a plurality of the electoral vote, i.e. when no presidential 
candidate receives a majority of the votes.  Id. at 74; see also supra note 19 (explaining the 
Framers’ intent regarding the House contingency plan).  This process, originally governed 
by Article II of the U.S. Constitution, is now governed by the Twelfth Amendment.  See 
BENNETT, supra note 28, at 23.  Prior to the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote for 
vice president; instead, the person receiving the second highest number of votes would 
become vice president.  Id.  The Twelfth Amendment was drafted and ratified after the 
1800 presidential election when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr—both members of the 
same party who had run as a ticket together—received the same number of votes, all votes 
being cast only for president.  Id. at 22–23.  Congress had to decide which of the two would 
be president and which would be vice president despite Jefferson having been the 
presidential candidate and Burr the vice presidential candidate.  Id.  In shrewd political 
maneuvering, the party of John Adams, Jefferson’s original opponent, supported Aaron 
Burr against Jefferson so that there was a deadlock.  Id. at 22.  Jefferson eventually won, but 
the debacle prompted passage of the Twelfth Amendment, which separates presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates.  Id. at 23.  It also, for purposes of the contingency plan 
when there is not a majority winner, gives the House the top three vote getters in the 
election and not the top five as Article II had dictated.  Id. 
 Today, the thought that the House could determine the president of the United States 
is considered by some otherwise proponents of the Electoral College as horrible for 
democracy.  See ROSS, supra note 42, at 127 (elucidating that the House contingency plan 
could “degenerate into self-interested deal-making among representatives[, making the 
President feel] indebted” and damaging our system of government, “which values 
separation of powers among the branches”).  The “faithless elector” problem is the result of 
presidential electors being able to cast votes in opposition to voters’ expectations.  Id. at 
113.  Alexander Hamilton argued for the Electoral College by pointing to electors as “men 
most capable of analizing [sic] the qualities adapted to the station [of President].”  THE 
FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).  Hamilton says that the electors will have the 
requisite information for investigation, will deliberate, and be able to discern who could be 
the best President.  Id.  Hamilton further says the electors—being so close to the people—
will have a “sense” for their desires, but this did not mean electors would necessarily vote 
for the candidates wanted by a provincial people possibly swayed by the “little arts of 
popularity.”  Id. at 344, 346. 
 Historically, only a dozen or so electors have cast votes contrary to their instructions.  
BENNETT, supra note 28, at 96.  Today, while electors may pledge to vote for specific 
candidates, they retain the power to vote for whomever they desire, or even abstain from 
voting altogether.  ROSS, supra note 42, at 113–14.  For example, three “faithless” votes could 
have given Al Gore the election in 2000 and a change in two electoral votes would have 
deprived Bush of a majority, requiring the House contingency plan to take effect.  Id. at 113.  
Tara Ross, who is a strong advocate of maintaining the Electoral College largely as-is, says, 
“[i]f any change is to be made to the presidential election system, it should be to eliminate 
the role of elector and automate the process of casting the states’ electoral votes.”  Id. at 114. 
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system, and preserves a necessary component of the separation of 
powers—federalism.46 
Despite the prevalence of the winner-take-all system, two states, 
Maine and Nebraska, apportion their electors according to which 
presidential team wins each congressional district, while the two 
remaining electors correlating to the two Senate seats are designated 
according to the state’s popular vote.47  These states “are reminders of 
the flexibility that the Founders built into the U.S. Constitution.”48  It is to 
this flexibility that this Note now turns.49 
                                                 
46 E.g., ROSS, supra note 42, at 34, 39, 41, 58, 110, 170.  Tyranny of the majority is 
understood as, in a direct democracy, the capability of fifty-one percent of the people to 
rule over the other forty-nine percent because representatives are merely purveyors of the 
public will.  Id. at 34.  The magnification of minority interests is exemplified by the Jewish 
vote in New York carrying more influence than it would in a national vote, or as in Strom 
Thurmond’s presidential bid in 1948, which garnered an insignificant 2.4% popular vote 
but thirty-nine electoral votes (7.3%).  Id. at 41, 212.  Magnifying a presidential mandate to 
govern is illustrated by John F. Kennedy’s tiny popular vote win in 1960—.2%—which was 
magnified into an eighty-two vote win in the Electoral College; only two elections since 
1804 were won by fewer than a twenty electoral vote margin.  Id. at 103–04. 
 By encouraging national coalition building, a proponent of the Electoral College 
means that presidential campaigns must be national in character and cannot focus on, for 
example, only rural areas or only urban areas, nor can small states be excluded.  Id. at 87–
88; see also George F. Will, From Schwarzenegger, a Veto for Voters’ Good, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2006, at A27 (arguing that the coalition building required by the Electoral College requires 
a “politics of accommodation” that prevents narrowly defined majorities).  But see KOZA ET 
AL., supra note 17, at 10, 11 (listing seventeen states in the 2004 presidential election that 
received ninety-nine percent of advertising expenditures—five states of these receiving 
seventy-two percent of the funds—and sixteen states which received ninety-two percent of 
all presidential and vice-presidential visits during the campaign). 
 The Electoral College is also said to minimize fraud by isolating allegations of fraud to 
states where a recount is necessary only if the vote is close; in a direct popular vote system, 
suspected fraud could trigger national recounts at great cost.  ROSS, supra note 42, at 110.  
State rights are also intricately woven into the Electoral College, the Great Compromise—
which gave to small states equal representation in the Senate and to big states more 
representation in the House—being the basis for how many electoral votes each state gets 
to cast.  Id. at 50.  The Electoral College also helps to prevent fractious third-party 
candidates from dividing the nation.  See Will, supra (using Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential 
bid, wherein he received 18.9% of the popular vote but no electoral votes, to show how the 
Electoral College prevented the fragmentation inherent in a direct popular vote).  The 
federal electoral system also helps protect the country itself by muting extremist interests 
and dangerous factions who, for want of a national platform, are unable to appeal to the 
people at large and are instead forced to moderate themselves as they attempt to build 
coalitions with other groups in other states.  ROSS, supra note 42, at 58. 
47 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 7. 
48 Id. 
49 There are many more technical and mechanical aspects involved in the Electoral 
College which are beyond the scope of this Note.  See generally 3 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2006 & Supp. 
II 2008) (codifying the many procedures involved in counting electoral votes, certification 
of electors, the steps to take in the event of vacancies, etc.).  See also Stephen Siegel, The 
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2. The Scope and Methods by Which States Have Historically 
Appointed Electors 
The United States Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion in Bush v. 
Gore is rich in recognition of a state’s plenary power in choosing 
presidential electors pursuant to Article II of the United States 
Constitution.50  Set against the backdrop of the 2000 presidential election 
between Al Gore and George W. Bush, the central dispute in Bush was 
the applicability of the “safe harbor” provision found in 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
which holds that “[i]f any State shall have provided . . . for its final 
determination of . . . the appointment of all or any of the electors . . . at 
least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such 
determination . . . shall be conclusive.”51  This provision means that 
Congress cannot challenge how a state chooses its electors so long as 
they are chosen by the allotted time.52  After Florida’s popular election to 
choose its presidential electors, Gore alleged that legal votes had not 
been counted and asked for a recount.53  Determining that a recount that 
satisfied equal protection parameters could not be completed in time to 
meet the safe-harbor deadline, the Court had to decide which branch of 
Florida’s government ultimately controlled the appointment of 
presidential electors:  the judicial branch or the legislative branch.54  If 
                                                                                                             
Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541 (2004) 
(expounding upon the Electoral Count Act of 1887). 
50 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (maintaining throughout the case the 
assumption that the Court’s role was to determine which part of Florida’s government had 
supreme authority over appointing presidential electors). 
51 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 960–63 (2d ed. 2005). 
52 3 U.S.C. § 5. 
53 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 962.  In the Florida trial court, Al Gore challenged the 
certification of vote counts in several Florida counties, arguing that according to Florida 
statute, legal votes had not been counted.  Id.  The Florida trial court denied Gore relief.  Id.  
On appeal, the matter was certified to the Florida Supreme Court, which found that there 
were indeed legal, uncounted votes.  Id.  The Florida Supreme Court ordered a manual 
recount.  Id. at 963. 
54 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5, the 
Florida statute required vote counts be given by canvassing boards to the Florida secretary 
of state by a specified date so as to take advantage of the federal safe-harbor provision, a 
date which could not have been met if the manual recount had taken place.  Id. at 111.  
Thus, there were two Florida statutes in conflict with one another—the statute under which 
Gore had asked for a recount and the statute under which the secretary of state mandated a 
return of the votes by a specified date in order to take advantage of the safe-harbor 
provision.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 961.  The Florida Supreme Court believed it was 
exercising its constitutionally mandated power of statutory interpretation by harmonizing 
the two conflicting statutes.  Id.  It decided to give those manually recounting the votes 
enough time to do so, therefore permitting a recount that would have extended beyond the 
date allowing Florida to take advantage of the safe-harbor provision.  Id.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s per curiam opinion found that the Florida statute favoring 3 U.S.C. § 5—the safe-
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the legislative branch had ultimate control, then its intent to honor the 
safe-harbor provision meant that if a recount could not be done before 
December 12, then there could be no recount.55  If the judicial branch had 
ultimate control, then its decision to proceed with a recount that could 
not be finished by December 12 would stand.56  In reaching its 
conclusion that the Florida legislature was not bound by the Florida 
Constitution when exercising its Article II powers to appoint presidential 
electors, the per curiam opinion cited McPherson v. Blacker to declare that 
the “the state legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing 
electors is plenary.”57 
McPherson itself offers concrete historical examples of the flexibility 
of state power in appointing electors.58  The appointment of electors in 
the first presidential election was made by the legislatures of 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, and South Carolina.59  
Pennsylvania had a general ticket election.60  Maryland also had a 
general election but with the stipulation that five of the electors be from 
the Western Shore and three from the Eastern Shore.61  New York failed 
to appoint any electors because of a disagreement between the New York 
                                                                                                             
harbor provision—controlled as an application of the state legislature’s U.S. Constitution 
Article II power, which permitted Florida to appoint electors in whatever manner its 
legislature determined.  Id. at 111–12.  Thus, the Florida Supreme Court overreached by 
infringing the Florida legislature’s prerogative to take advantage of 3 U.S.C. § 5.  Id.  For 
more on the safe-harbor provision, see supra note 27. 
55 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 961. 
56 Id. 
57 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)). 
58 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29.  McPherson involved a political drama that took place in 
Michigan, a microcosm of the incessant political wrangling between Republicans and 
Democrats that still occurs on the national level.  See KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 53–54.  In 
the 1888 presidential election, President Grover Cleveland won the national popular vote 
but lost his presidential bid within the Electoral College framework.  Id. at 53.  At that time, 
most states had winner-take-all elections, including Michigan, prior to 1890.  Id.  While 
Michigan was primarily a Republican-dominated state at the time, the Democrats won 
control of the Michigan legislature in the 1890 midterm elections.  Id.  Expecting that 
Michigan’s electoral votes would again go to the Republican nominee in the 1892 
presidential election, the newly elected Democrats changed Michigan from winner-take-all 
to state congressional district voting with each of the two senatorial electors chosen from a 
combined half of the congressional districts.  Id.  In this fashion, in the 1892 presidential 
election, Michigan would be able to contribute some electoral votes to the Democratic 
presidential nominee.  Id.  The Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan legislature had the 
power to act as it did in restricting presidential elector appointments.  Id. at 53.  The 
outcome of the Michigan legislature’s act and subsequent affirmation by the Supreme 
Court resulted in five of fourteen Michigan electoral votes going for Democratic 
presidential nominee Grover Cleveland.  Id. at 53–54. 
59 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 29–30. 
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assembly and the New York Senate over how many electors each 
chamber would get to choose.62  Virginia had elections for the electors by 
districts other than the districts used for electing Representatives to the 
House.63  Massachusetts had a two-tiered system wherein voters voted in 
their congressional districts for electors and the top two candidates in 
each district were then voted upon, district by district, by the 
Massachusetts legislature with two additional at-large electors also being 
voted for by the legislature.64  In the fourth presidential election, in 
Tennessee, by an Act of its legislature in 1799, delegates were selected by 
the legislature who then voted for the electors.65 
In McPherson, after continuing its exposé of electoral appointment 
through subsequent elections, the Court, quoting Justice Story, 
articulated that power is different than policy and that while many 
“ingenious minds” may take offense at the arbitrary nature of the 
Electoral College, until there is a constitutional amendment, the power 
remains vested in the state legislature.66  Citing to McPherson, the per 
curiam opinion in Bush reaffirmed the Court’s recognition of this state 
power when it said, “[t]he State, of course, after granting the franchise in 
the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint 
electors.”67 
                                                 
62 Id. at 30. 
63 Id. at 29. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 32. 
66 Id. at 33, 35–36.  The Court continued: 
Mr. Justice Story, in considering the subject in his Commentaries on 
the Constitution, and writing nearly fifty years after the adoption of 
that instrument, after stating that “in some states the legislatures have 
directly chosen the electors by themselves; in others, they have been 
chosen by the people by a general ticket throughout the whole State; 
and in others, by the people by electoral districts, fixed by the 
legislature, a certain number of electors being apportioned to each 
district,” adds:  “No question has ever arisen as to the constitutionality 
of either mode, except that by a direct choice by the legislature.  But 
this, though often doubted by able and ingenious minds, has been 
firmly established in practice ever since the adoption of the 
Constitution, and does not now seem to admit of controversy, even if a 
suitable tribunal existed to adjudicate upon it.”  And he remarks that 
“it has been thought desirable by many statesmen to have the 
Constitution amended so as to provide for a uniform mode of choice 
by the people.” 
Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted). 
67 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).  The Court quotes a single line from McPherson 
that reads, “[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any 
time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.”  Id. (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 
35).  The full text from which this section was taken reads as follows: 
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There is one caveat to the states’ plenary power in appointing 
electors:  when a state via its legislature charges its people to appoint 
electors through a popular election, equal weight must be afforded to 
each vote and equal dignity is owed to each voter.68  In other words, 
when utilizing popular elections, states are confined to constitutionally 
mandated equal protection parameters regarding voter qualifications.69  
The Fourteenth Amendment expressly recognizes the popular vote as a 
means for appointing presidential electors by warning that state 
representative apportionment in Congress will be “reduced in the 
proportion” to the eligible male voters denied the vote for presidential 
electors.70  Subsequent amendments took away most state discretion for 
determining who can vote in popular elections by mandating that the 
franchise be extended to blacks, women, and all U.S. citizens eighteen 
years of age or older; further, no citizen can be denied the right to vote 
for a presidential elector for failure to pay any tax.71 
                                                                                                             
The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly 
with the legislatures of the several States.  They may be chosen by the 
legislature, or the legislature may provide that they shall be elected by 
the people of the State at large, or in districts, as are members of 
Congress, which was the case formerly in many States; and it is, no 
doubt, competent for the legislature to authorize the governor, or the 
Supreme Court of the State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these 
electors.  This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by 
the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them 
or modified by their State constitutions any more than can their power 
to elect Senators of the United States.  Whatever provisions may be 
made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the 
people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the 
power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated. 
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 34–35 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)). 
68 E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05 (articulating the same). 
69 See, e.g., id. (articulating the obligation of states to ensure equal protection for popular 
elections). 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  Thus, the black male population would not be included 
in a state’s total population for means of allotting House seats to that state if black males 
over twenty-one years of age were not entitled to vote.  Id.  The relevance of this section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment has been nullified by the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
mandates that voters may not be denied the franchise because of race or color.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV. 
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (1971); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (1964); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX (1920); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (1870); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 
380–81 (1963) (holding that statewide elections cannot use a system which weighs some 
votes more than others). 
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Recognizing that states have plenary power limited only by 
constitutional grants of equal protection in determining which agents 
shall appoint its electors, several states, taking advantage of the 
flexibility offered by Article II of the Constitution, have ratified the NPV 
legislation that is, as of now, yet to be executed.72  This Note now turns to 
this legislation. 
B. National Popular Vote Legislation 
Currently, six states and the District of Columbia have ratified the 
National Popular Vote Bill.73  The impetus of these statutes was the 2000 
Presidential Election in which George W. Bush lost to Al Gore in the 
national popular vote but won the Electoral College Vote and thus the 
Presidency.74  In February 2006, the organization National Popular Vote 
held its initial press conference.75 
                                                 
72 Infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
73 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com (last visited Dec. 
23, 2010) [hereinafter NPV MAIN].  The six states are Illinois, Hawaii, Maryland, New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Washington (with a total of seventy-four electoral votes when 
combined with those of the District of Columbia).  Id.  Most recently, the District of 
Columbia enacted the National Popular Vote Bill on October 12, 2010.  NATIONAL POPULAR 
VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/states.php?s=DC (Oct. 12, 2010) 
[hereinafter NPV D.C.].  Beyond these six states, the legislation has passed both chambers 
in four other states, one house in ten other states, and has been introduced in eleven other 
states.  Id.  The text of the agreement provides that any state of the United States and the 
District of Columbia may become a member of the agreement by its enactment and that 
each member state shall conduct a statewide popular election for President and Vice 
President of the United States.  E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III (2010).  The 
agreement requires each member state’s chief election official to immediately convey its 
own state popular vote total and then to add together the popular vote of every other state 
conducting a statewide popular vote (regardless if the state conducting the vote has ratified 
the agreement) and the District of Columbia in order to determine the national popular 
vote count.  Id. at art. III.  The agreement provides that in the nearly impossible case of a tie, 
each state’s electors shall pledge their votes to that state’s popular vote winner.  Id.  The 
agreement is to take effect in any year in which the agreement has been ratified by states 
cumulatively possessing a majority of the electoral votes—270—and no later than July 20 of 
that year.  Id.  When it takes effect, each state’s electors shall cast their votes in accordance 
with the aggregated popular vote tally of all the states combined and the winner will be 
designated the national popular vote winner.  Id.  The agreement allows member states to 
withdraw from the agreement, but requires this to be done before the final six months of 
the current president’s term of office.  Id. at art. IV.  The agreement also provides that it will 
terminate if the Electoral College is abolished.  Id. 
74 Robert Bennett produced vague outlines of the idea in the spring of 2001.  Robert 
Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 
2d 241, 241 (2001).  The plan was further developed by Bennett in subsequent publications 
and then by Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar, who are also considered the idea’s 
founders.  KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 270–71.  The 2000 election represents only the 
newest incarnation of dissatisfaction of some with how the Electoral College seems to 
work.  E.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33 (1892) (“[I]t has been thought desirable by 
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The NPV works in the following way.  Utilizing the plenary power 
of state presidential elector appointment, ratifying states predetermine 
that their presidential electoral ballots be cast in accordance with the 
winner of the national popular vote when enough states have ratified the 
legislation so that their total combined electoral votes number 270—the 
amount required to avoid the House contingency plan if all 538 members 
cast electoral ballots.76  The House contingency plan originates from the 
Twelfth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to vote for 
President if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes cast.77  
Until such a time when enough states have passed the NPV, it will 
remain inoperative.78  While the NPV cannot compel non-ratifying states 
to hold statewide popular elections, it does require each ratifying state to 
hold a statewide popular election.79  This mandate helps to establish a 
necessary precondition for the agreement—that there will be popular 
votes to count.80 
Following election-Tuesday, the chief election officer of every state, 
usually the secretary of state, is to obtain statements from all states, 
regardless of if they have adopted the NPV, designating the number of 
popular votes cast for each candidate.81  The NPV requires use of the 
short ballot so that votes from all ratifying states can be easily added 
together.82  The authors of the legislation recognize that if a non-member 
state decided to take the presidential vote away from its people, or if a 
non-member state removed the names of the presidential candidates, 
there would be no votes to count from that state.83  In this event, the 
national popular vote would be determined by all member states and 
                                                                                                             
many statesmen to have the Constitution amended so as to provide for a uniform mode of 
choice by the people.” (quoting Justice Story)). 
75 Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?, 42 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 511 (2009). 
76 E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III. 
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  The House votes, each state having only one vote, for 
president from the three candidates who receive the most electoral votes.  Id.  The Senate 
votes for the vice president, each Senator having one vote.  Id.  It is possible under this 
contingency plan for the Congress to elect a President and Vice President from two 
different political parties.  Id.  For more on the House contingency plan, see supra notes 19 
and 45. 
78 E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 art. II–III. 
79 See, e.g., id. (“Each member state shall conduct a statewide popular election for 
President and Vice President of the United States.”). 
80 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 250. 
81 Id. at 253. 
82 Id. at 252.  The short ballot is used in order to permit “the aggregation, from state to 
state, of the popular votes that have been cast for various presidential slates.”  Id.  For an 
explanation of the short ballot, see supra text accompanying note 33. 
83 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 253–54. 
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non-member states holding popular elections with presidential names on 
the ballots.84  The winner of the largest number of popular votes across 
the nation shall be designated the “national popular vote winner.”85 
The NPV has sparked criticism laced with policy reasons critical of 
the legislation; most of these arguments being the same as those used in 
support of the Electoral College.86  The NPV has been called simple 
minded and “[a]n [e]nd [r]un [a]round the Constitution” because it is 
perceived as changing the Electoral College without amending the 
Constitution.87  NPV promoters offer their own slew of policy rationale 
in support of the plan, from the Electoral College’s shameful birth in the 
slave-driven Connecticut Compromise to the disparity in the weight 
accorded individual votes from different states.88  Policy reasons aside, 
several legal arguments against the NPV have concentrated on the 
Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.89 
C. The “Compact Clause” Challenge to the National Popular Vote 
Several recent law review articles conclude that the NPV would, 
upon its execution when enough states ratify it, be a violation of the 
Compact Clause.90  The Compact Clause is contained in Article I, section 
                                                 
84 Id. at 254. 
85 E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 20/5. art. III (2010). 
86 E.g., About Us, SAVE OUR STATES, http://www.saveourstates.com/about/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2010) (arguing against the NPV by citing the strengths of the Electoral College).  
Likewise, those arguing for the NPV cite reasons why the Electoral College is harmful or 
outdated.  E.g., Birch Bayh, Forward in KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxv (stating that the 
Electoral College has outlived any positive role it once played and that the NPV is a good 
strategy for overcoming the shortcomings of the Electoral College). 
87 See David S. Broder, An End Run Around the Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at 
B07 (arguing that the NPV is an end run around the Constitution because it seeks to change 
the Electoral College without utilizing the necessary amendment process); Julia Silverman, 
Oregon, Other States Consider End Run Around Electoral College, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 28, 2007, 
8:01 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003545454_webelectoral28. 
html; Will, supra note 46 (praising California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger after he 
vetoed the NPV legislation which, had it become law, “would have imparted dangerous 
momentum to a recurring simple-mindedness”).  David Broder argues that NPV advocates 
ignore the NPV’s impact on “two of the fundamental characteristics of the American 
scheme of government:  the federal system and the two-party system.”  Broder, supra. 
88 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at xxiii, xxvi, 21, 22. 
89 See infra note 90 (discussing the same). 
90 E.g., Charles S. Doskow & David A. Sonner, Vox Populi:  Is It Time to Reform the 
Electoral College?, 55 FED. LAW. 33 (2008); Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007).  But see Pincus, supra 
note 75, at 511 (arguing that although the NPV would not violate the Compact Clause, the 
Court should revisit the Compact Clause so that the NPV does violate the clause); Adam 
Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON L. REV. 717, 749 (2007) (posing 
the possibility that the NPV is viable under current Compact Clause jurisprudence, but that 
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10, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution and in relevant part reads:  “No State 
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State . . . .”91  Because the NPV is an agreement 
which, as written and ratified, requires several states to have ratified the 
plan before it takes effect, it has been posited that such an agreement 
would require the consent of Congress, without which the agreement 
would be rendered unconstitutional.92  The overarching concern of this 
Note is addressing how this challenge to the NPV implicates each state’s 
republican form of government.93 
                                                                                                             
it may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back). 
 For a general argument against the current viability of the Court’s interpretation of the 
Compact Clause, see Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. 
L. REV. 285 (2003).  Several law review articles have specifically addressed state 
coordination for popularly electing the president and have concluded that this would not 
violate the Compact Clause.  E.g., Bennett, supra note 74, at 170–71; Jennifer S. Hendricks, 
Popular Election of the President:  Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218 
(2008); Jennings “Jay” Wilson, Note, Bloc Voting in the Electoral College:  How the Ignored 
States Can Become Relevant and Implement Popular Election Along the Way, 5 ELECTION L.J. 384, 
402–03 (2006) (explicating that the agreement is not an agreement under the Court’s 
understanding; that if it is an agreement, such an agreement still does not fall within the 
purview of the Court; and finally, that because there is no case law addressing this issue, 
there is no way of knowing if the Court would entertain a challenge to the NPV under the 
Compact Clause).  Other proponents of a national popular vote utilizing the Electoral 
College have also dismissed the Compact Clause as inapplicable.  E.g., KOZA ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 187–241; Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct 
National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution:  Part Three of a Three-Part 
Series on the 2000 Election and the Electoral College, FINDLAW.COM, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.html (Dec. 28, 2001).  Akhil Reed Amar and 
Vikram David Amar ponder: 
Should expressly coordinated state laws of the sort we are imagining 
be deemed an implicit interstate agreement requiring congressional 
blessing under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution?  Probably not.  
After all, each state would retain complete unilateral freedom to switch 
back to its older system for any future election, and the coordinated 
law creates no new interstate governmental apparatus.  Indeed, the 
cooperating states acting together would be exercising no more power 
than they are entitled to wield individually.  (The matter might be 
different if the coordinating states had sought to freeze other states 
out—say, by agreeing to back the candidate winning the most total 
votes within the coordinating states as a collective bloc, as opposed to 
the most total votes nationwide.) 
Id. 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
92 Muller, supra note 90, at 373.  Muller also considers the NPV unconstitutional under 
the Compact Clause because states are restrained from withdrawing from it for a specific 
period and because non-member states are too negatively affected.  Id.  But see Hendricks, 
supra note 90, at 225–26 (responding specifically to Muller’s article and concluding that the 
NPV does not violate the Compact Clause). 
93 See infra Part IV (concluding that requiring congressional consent for the NPV would 
violate the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
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The first case to reach the Supreme Court that specifically addressed 
this clause was Virginia v. Tennessee.94  Compact Clause analysis is 
currently guided by U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission.95  Both 
Virginia and U.S. Steel Corp. offer the same conclusion:  the clause is 
meant to prevent the “formation of any combination tending 
to . . . encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States.”96  U.S. Steel affirmed Virginia’s holding, which the Court must 
consider if the compact in question “enhances state power quoad the 
National Government.”97  Further, the Court in U.S. Steel looked to actual 
infringement on federal sovereignty as opposed to Virginia’s emphasis 
on potential infringement.98 
                                                 
94 148 U.S 503 (1893).  This case involved a boundary dispute between the two named 
parties.  Id. at 504.  The states settled the dispute by a compact or agreement after a joint-
commissioned study determined what was thought to be the proper boundary.  Id. at 514–
17.  Congress never expressly consented to the compact that recognized the boundary.  Id. 
at 517.  Later, Virginia decided that the boundary established by the agreement was not 
correct and sought to invalidate the agreement under the Compact Clause because there 
had been no express consent by Congress.  Id.  The Court held that Congress had implied 
its consent and that the Compact Clause applies to alliances between states that might 
infringe on the power of the federal government.  Id. at 525. 
95 See 434 U.S 452, 478–79 (1978) (holding that not all agreements between states are 
subject to strictures of the Compact Clause but that instead only those agreements that are 
directed to the formation of any combination tending to increase the political power in the 
states and which may encroach on or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States). 
 The Multistate Tax Compact was drafted in 1966 and had twenty-one state members 
in 1978 at the time this case was heard.  Id. at 454.  It was created to streamline tax liability 
and payments for people owing taxes in multiple states.  Id. at 452.  U.S. Steel brought a 
suit after being threatened with an audit by the Multistate Tax Commission.  Id.  U.S. Steel 
wanted the compact to be invalidated under the Compact Clause because it had not 
received the consent of Congress.  Id. 
96 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.  Further: 
Quoting with approval Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States, the Court held that while “the consent of Congress 
may be properly required, in order to check any infringement of the 
rights of the national government,” nonetheless, “a total prohibition to 
enter into any compact or agreement might be attended with 
permanent inconvenience or public mischief.”  For this reason, the 
Court concluded, the Compact Clause cannot have been intended to 
apply to all interstate agreements.  Rather, “looking at the object of the 
constitutional provision,” the Court determined that the Compact 
Clause’s “prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination 
tending to . . .  encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of 
the United States. 
Pincus, supra note 75, at 523 (footnotes omitted). 
97 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
98 Greve, supra note 90, at 306–07. 
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How or whether an interstate compact potentially or actually 
infringes on federal power is a vertical analysis; the Court has 
abandoned any horizontal analysis of whether an interstate compact 
infringes on the rights of non-member states.99  While most interstate 
compacts operate with congressional approval, there are no instances of 
interstate compacts between states being invalidated by the Court due to 
a lack of congressional approval.100  The Multistate Tax Agreement and 
the more recent Master Settlement Agreement, which ended litigation 
against giant tobacco companies, are two instances of compacts 
established without congressional consent but upheld by federal courts 
in the face of Compact Clause challenges.101 
The Council of State Governments has classified twenty-one types of 
interstate compacts, but no interstate compact has ever addressed 
elections.102  As the current Compact Clause regime stands under U.S. 
Steel, non-member states may suffer secondary effects of an interstate 
compact without the compact violating the Compact Clause, so long as 
the sovereignty of the non-member states is not threatened.103  This Note 
now turns to the nature of state sovereignty under the Constitution’s 
Guarantee Clause. 
D. “The Guarantee Clause” 
The exact denotation of “republican form of government” is 
impossible to pin down.104  Its seminal origins as a textual reference 
within American law lie in Thomas Jefferson’s 1776 rough drafts of 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 285, 288–89.  Examples of subject matter covered by interstate compacts include:  
agriculture, boundaries, crime control and corrections, education, energy, facilities, 
fisheries, flood-control, marketing and development, motor-vehicles, etc.  KOZA ET AL., 
supra note 17, at 192–200; see also What Is the National Center for Interstate Compacts?, 
COUNCIL OF ST. GOVERNMENTS, http://www.csg.org/programs/policyprograms/NCIC/ 
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (“The National Center for Interstate Compacts 
(NCIC) is designed to be an information clearinghouse, . . . a primary facilitator in assisting 
states review, revise and create new interstate compacts to solve multi-state problems or 
provide alternatives to federal pre-emption.”). 
101 Greve, supra note 90, at 289.  The Master Settlement Agreement was a deal reached 
between the attorneys general of forty-six states and U.S. tobacco manufacturers, providing 
for payment in damages to the states.  Id. at 287.  No state legislator ever voted for the 
agreement, which amounts to a tax on smokers, nor did Congress ever approve the 
agreement.  Id.  Federal courts have uniformly rejected Compact Clause claims against the 
Master Settlement Agreement.  Id. 
102 Muller, supra note 90, at 390.  The Council of State Governments is a body that 
monitors all current interstate compacts.  Id. 
103 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S 452, 477 (1978). 
104 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 18; see also infra notes 105–24 and accompanying text. 
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Virginia’s constitution.105  The intellectual origins of republican 
government run much deeper, from Ancient Greece to sixteenth-century 
Florence, to seventeenth century England.106  Article IV, section 4 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which contains the Guarantee Clause, provides that:  
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”107 
What exactly the expansive language “republican form of 
government” means has been the focus of debate since the Guarantee 
                                                 
105 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 15.  Jefferson recognized that territory claimed by Virginia 
would eventually become independent.  Id.  According to Jefferson, a requisite for the 
formation of new colonies was “that the States so formed shall be distinct Republican States 
and be admitted Members of the Federal Union having the same Rights of Sovereignty 
Freedom and Independence as the other States.”  Id. at 16.  Jefferson also drafted a later-
aborted ordinance for the Northwest Territory that required its “respective governments 
[to] be in republican forms, and shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds any 
hereditary title.”  Id.  Subsequently, a republican government clause found its way into the 
Northwest Ordinance drafted by Nathan Dane for the Confederation Congress, which 
granted a “broad guarantee of civil liberty” and required that “the constitution and 
government, so to be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles 
contained in these articles.”  Id. at 17.  This broad grant of liberty included civil and 
religious liberty, “which form the basis whereon these republics[,] their laws and 
constitutions, are erected.”  Id.  Further, Confederation Congress included in the ordinance 
habeas corpus, jury trial, due process, inviolability of contracts, public schools, just dealings 
with Indians, federal supremacy, and exclusion of slavery.  Id.  However, this broad 
definition of republican government was not necessarily accepted by all colonial 
Americans and was not the universally perceived basis for the inclusion of the Guarantee 
Clause in the U.S. Constitution.  See infra notes 107–24 (discussing the various 
understandings of republican government). 
106 See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:  FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).  Madison found inspiration in 
David Hume’s contemplation of a “republican form of government” in his essay, Idea of 
Perfect Commonwealth.  RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 19.  Concerning representation, David 
Hume says: 
The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good judges 
enough of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and 
therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuse the best, or 
nearly the best representative:  But they are wholly unfit for county-
meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic.  Their 
ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them. 
David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 
VOL. 2 487 (1882). 
107 The full text of Article IV, section 4 reads:  “The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, §  4.  This 
article contains three clauses:  the “Guarantee Clause,” the “Invasion Clause,” and the 
“Domestic Violence” clause.  Id.  The Guarantee Clause is distinct from the other two 
clauses, and yet, its narrative has been tied to them in its common law history by their 
proximity.  See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 12, at 104, 109 (relating how President John Tyler 
would only interfere with a threat to Rhode Island if there was armed insurrection). 
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Clause’s inception.108  John Adams admitted in 1807 that he did not 
believe any man would ever understand the Guarantee Clause.109  
Maybe the clearest explanation of republican government was 
articulated by James Madison in the Federalist Papers as a representative 
democracy with an absolute prohibition on titles of nobility.110  
“[R]epublic” elicits the welfare of the people—the public good—as the 
object of primary concern for rulers; a republic is a state that belongs to 
the people, not the crown.111  The federal government was not to be a 
monarchy; the power to govern would not remain with vested interests 
transmitted through time to those with familial or related interests.112  
The dread of a monarchy was so pervasive that when rumors circulated 
during the Convention that a European family might be given power or 
George Washington made King, the convention broke its silence to the 
outside world to reassure that they were definitely not considering a 
king.113 
While Americans generally agreed that republican government 
meant the absence of monarchy or hereditary rule, it also meant the 
absence of direct democracy to those organizing the federal 
                                                 
108 Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988); see also Kristin Feeley, Comment, Guaranteeing a 
Federally Elected President, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1427, 1436–37 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“The 
Guarantee Clause has been read to prohibit direct democracy, require campaign finance 
reform, protect individual rights, protect political rights, mandate wealth 
redistribution[,] . . . limit governmental power, and require a system of checks and 
balances.”). 
109 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 72 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 
20, 1807)).  The quote continues, “[t]he word [republic] is so loose and indefinite that 
successive predominant factions will put glosses and constructions upon it as different as 
light and darkness.”  Id. 
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 191 (James Madison). 
111 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 55–56 
(1969) (quoting Thomas Paine and Edmund Pendleton). 
112 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
320–22 (1987) (recounting the concern that an “enterprising Citizen” would establish a 
monarchy and spread his ideas from state to state and the consequent need for the 
Guarantee Clause); North Carolina Ratification Convention Journal (July 30, 1788), 
CONSOURCE, http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=72849 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2010) (discussing the Guarantee Clause as a means of preventing any state 
from establishing a monarchy or aristocracy). 
113 PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 14.  But see Letter, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 15 Mar. 
1879, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ 
documents/v1ch14s49.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (discussing the impossibility of a 
monarchy ever being established in the states because the younger generation was so 
learned in republicanism). 
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government.114  In Federalist No. 10, James Madison argued that a 
republican government would protect encroachment upon minority 
rights by majority rule.115  It would do this by having people elect 
representatives who would make the laws.116  Thus, while the 
“fundamental maxim of republican government . . . requires that the 
sense of the majority should prevail,” popular sovereignty would be 
channeled through an agency concept of government:  “the people are 
the principals, their elected representatives the agents chosen to carry 
out the popular will.”117  A republican government, while deriving all of 
its power from “the great body of people,” was to be a “government of 
laws, not of men.”118  In this light, the Guarantee Clause would also, 
beyond preventing monarchy, help to prevent popular uprisings that 
might threaten the stability of a state government under attack.119 
The meaning of the Guarantee Clause takes on a different hue from 
the perspective of someone hesitant to ratify a new National Constitution 
                                                 
114 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 18 (“Republican government was thought to be an 
alternative to these extremes, a middle course between the Scylla of tyranny and the 
Charybdis of anarchy.”). 
115 Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 849, 868 (1994). 
116 Id. 
117 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); WIECEK, supra note 12, at 23.  Embodied 
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the notion that “[a]ll power is vested in, and 
consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and 
at all times amenable to them.”  Id. 
118 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); WIECEK, supra note 12, at 25.  Furthermore, 
[o]n the principles of government, a broad consensus reigned.  
Government existed for the good of the many, and to protect the 
liberty, property, and equal rights of the citizen.  The idea that 
representation would help the government to determine the common 
good was commonplace, and so was the belief that the separation of 
powers was essential to the protection of rights. 
RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 19. 
119 See, e.g., Draft Sketch of Constitution by Edmund Randolph (July 26, 1787), CONSOURCE, 
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=69084 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2010) (“The guarantee is . . . to prevent the establishment of any government, not 
republican; . . . to protect each state against internal commotion; and . . . against external 
invasion. . . .  But this guarantee shall not operate (in the last Case) without an application 
from the legislature of a state.”); see also Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings 
of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 211, 241–42, n.280 (2003) (discussing Shay’s Rebellion and 
other popular uprisings by debtors and the poor as a motivation for the rich landowners to 
hold a convention that would allow for a strong central government to be established in 
order to protect their property interests; “Shays’ Rebellion confirm[ed] [the constitutional 
delegates’] worst fears about the populace”) (citing Michael Parenti, The Constitution as an 
Elitist Document, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 39, 43 (1980)).  The Virginia 
Plan for a Constitution incorporated a guarantee of republican government in response to 
two fears sweeping the nation:  rebellious popular mobs and monarchy.  Merritt, supra note 
108, at 29. 
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that would greatly change the political landscape by taking away powers 
formerly held by each of the states.120  In the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention, the alarm expressed by some delegates that an all-powerful 
federal government would quash state sovereignty was pacified by 
reference to the Guarantee Clause.121  In Massachusetts, in response to 
similar fears, it was said that, “as the United States guarantee to each 
State a Republican form of government; the State governments were as 
effectually secured, as though this Constitution should never be in 
force.”122  The same scenario, fears of a tyrannical federal government 
assuaged by the Guarantee Clause, played out in Maryland, New Jersey, 
and New York.123  While the National Constitution enshrined republican 
principles for the federal government, the stability of the new nation was 
seen as dependent on its member states freely exercising these same 
principles.124 
The ambiguity surrounding the clause and the expansive notion of 
republicanism prevents contemporary academics from completely 
unpacking its full meaning.125  What is true for scholarly works has been 
and remains true for the Supreme Court.126  In New York v. United States, 
                                                 
120 See RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 16 (“It is entirely possible—even probable, indeed almost 
certain—that the intentions of the framers and the understandings of the ratifiers and their 
electors diverged in numerous ways, on points both major and minor.”). 
121 See, e.g., Jasper Yeates’ Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (November 30, 
1787), CONSOURCE, http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=1891 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010) (stating that the objection was made that the constitution would 
“vest Congress with too large and dangerous state powers”).  The answer to this objection 
was: 
Candor and the character of the Federal Convention forbid the idea.  
The work does not justify the remark.  But it has been shown if the 
state governments fail, so must the federal government.  The 
Representatives must be chosen by persons voting for the most 
numerous branch of the state legislature.  The state legislatures must 
choose the Senate and appoint Electors to choose a President.  The 
judicial power depends on the Senate.  The 4th section of the 4th 
Article guarantees a republican form of government to each state (read 
it). 
Id. 
122 Newspaper Report of the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (January 24, 1788), 
CONSOURCE, http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documentid=5038 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
123 Merritt, supra note 108, at 33–35. 
124 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (pointing to the guarantee of republican 
government for the states as decisive proof of the republican nature of the National 
Constitution). 
125 See Merritt, supra note 108, at 23 (“[N]o single scholarly work can capture the full 
meaning of ‘republican government.’”). 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 127–39 (giving the history of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the Guarantee Clause). 
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Justice O’Connor highlighted that the Guarantee Clause has not often 
been cited in Supreme Court holdings.127  This is largely because of the 
political question doctrine that has been entwined with the Guarantee 
Clause ever since Luther v. Borden in 1849 where the Court refused to 
decide which of two Rhode Island governments was legitimate.128  The 
political question doctrine holds that some questions of constitutional 
                                                 
127 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (holding that the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause was not 
violated by provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which provided 
monetary incentives for compliance by states with a federal regulatory scheme and also 
provided for denial of access to disposal sites for failure to meet deadlines; under both 
provisions, states retained the ability to set their legislative agendas and state government 
officials remained accountable to local electorate). 
128 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 1–2 (1849); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, at 78 (recounting 
the facts of Luther and the Court’s approach to the case).  In 1842, the people of Rhode 
Island had not yet drafted or ratified their own state constitution, but were instead legally 
governed by a royal charter granted by King Charles II in 1663.  WIECEK, supra note 12, at 
86.  The charter restricted suffrage to freeholders—those owning $134 of real property—
and determined the number of representatives each town could have.  Id.  Urbanization 
and population growth had created disenfranchisement and malapportionment, which 
were in turn aggravated by ethnic and religious tensions.  Id. at 87–88.  The Rhode Island 
General Assembly operating under the Charter would not concede to demanded changes 
and so a “People’s Convention” was held.  Id. at 90–91.  Both the People’s Convention and 
the General Assembly submitted constitutions for ratification; the People’s was ratified 
14,000 to 52 and the Assembly’s was rejected 8689 to 8013.  Id. at 91.  A crisis soon emerged 
and the General Assembly passed a law outlawing participation in the Dorrite government.  
Id. at 95.  When Martin Luther broke the law by serving as a moderator for Dorrite 
Elections, Luther Borden—a freeholder—and other freeholders broke into Martin Luther’s 
home.  Id. at 113–15.  Luther filed a trespass action against Borden which the Court framed 
as an issue about which government was legitimate.  Id.  By the time Chief Justice Taney 
published his decision, the Dorrite government had been defunct for seven years.  Id. at 
123–24.  Any Rhode Islanders who might have once supported the now defunct Dorrite 
government had long since acquiesced to life under the Freeholder government and had 
recognized it as exclusively legitimate.  Id. at 118–19.  If the Court were to have ruled that 
the Freeholder government was illegitimate, then all of the laws passed by it, all of the 
taxes collected by it, all of the salaries paid by it, all of the criminals sentenced, and every 
act done by it would have been illegal.  Id.  In dicta, Chief Justice Taney addressed the 
Guarantee Clause: 
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide 
what government is the established one in a State.  For as the United 
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress 
must necessarily decide what government is established in the State 
before it can determine whether it is republican or not.  And when the 
senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of 
the Union, the authority of the government under which they are 
appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the 
proper constitutional authority.  And its decision is binding on every 
other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a 
judicial tribunal. 
WIECEK, supra note 12, at 121–22.  Although this was dicta, it was cited as the holding by 
subsequent courts.  Id. at 122. 
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law are non-justiciable because they are best resolved by the political 
branches of government.129  This Note does not address the legal 
arguments in support of applying the political question doctrine, but 
instead presumes what the Court has said in times past:  it should be the 
“province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”130 
It has been argued that in Luther, Justice Taney did not utilize the 
Guarantee Clause in his holding, but only in dicta.131  Regardless, Justice 
Taney’s dicta has been rendered into Luther’s holding by subsequent 
courts with the result that all Guarantee Clause suits were held 
categorically non-justiciable for over fifty years.132  In 1910, one year 
before Luther’s holding gutted Guarantee Clause jurisprudence, the 
Court recognized the Guarantee Clause as protecting state sovereignty 
when it ruled in Coyle v. Smith that Congress could not restrict 
Oklahoma’s placement of its capital.133  The Court said that locating a 
capital is “essentially and peculiarly [a] state power[].”134 
In the early 1960s, the Court removed the absolute barrier to cases 
brought under the Guarantee Clause, but the Court did not employ the 
clause in any of its holdings.135  In 1991, the Court decided Gregory v. 
                                                 
129 Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question’, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 
1031 (1984).  Erwin Chemerinsky notes that the Court usually dismisses Guarantee Clause 
claims with single sentences such as, “[a]s to the guaranty to every state of a republican 
form of government, it is well settled that the questions arising under [this clause] are 
political, not judicial, in character, and thus for the consideration of the Congress and not 
the courts.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 849.  Beyond the Guarantee Clause, the 
political question doctrine has applied to only five other areas:  the process for ratifying 
constitutional amendments, impeachment and removal of officials from office, foreign 
policy decision making, the training of state national guards, and decisions of national 
political parties.  Id. at 853. 
130 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
131 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 120.  The Court held the Freeholder government legitimate 
by virtue of the Rhode Island judicial system’s ratification through conduct—since the 
Rhode Island courts had “construed the laws and the constitution of the state, it was 
binding on federal courts.”  Id. 
132 Luther, 48 U.S. at 42 (holding claims brought under the Guarantee Clause non-
justiciable).  It was over fifty years later in 1912 in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 
Oregon that the Court definitively interpreted Luther as barring actions brought under the 
Guarantee Clause.  223 U.S. 118, 149 (1911); Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 862.  Fifty years 
later, this absolute barrier was removed.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (removing 
the absolute barrier to justiciability formerly posed by the political question doctrine). 
133 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1910). 
134 Id. at 565. 
135 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 228–29 (removing the 
absolute barrier to justiciability formerly posed by the political question doctrine).  While 
removing the political question doctrine from actions challenging the constitutionality of 
state actions, the Court refrained from applying the Guarantee Clause but instead upheld a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge.  Redish, supra note 129, at 1031 n.1, 
1033.  In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor recognized that Reynolds opened the 
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Ashcroft wherein Justice O’Connor bolstered the Court’s opinion in dicta 
with the Guarantee Clause by upholding Missouri’s determination of 
qualifications for government officials.136  She said that 
States [have the authority] to determine the 
qualifications of their most important government 
officials.  It is an authority that lies at “the heart of 
representative government.”  It is a power reserved to 
the States under the Tenth Amendment and guaranteed 
them by that provision of the Constitution under which 
the United States “guarantee[s] to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government.”137 
In New York v. United States, also decided in 1991, Justice O’Conner 
again recognized the possible viability of the Guarantee Clause; she set 
out two criteria by which the federal government may violate the 
Guarantee Clause:  (1) if the states lose the ability to set their legislative 
agendas, and (2) if state government officials can no longer remain 
accountable to the local electorate.138  This test had not been met in New 
York, so the Court instead relied in its ruling upon the Tenth 
Amendment.139 
As of the writing of this Note, Guarantee Clause jurisprudence is in 
stasis; there are no absolute barriers to its use by the political question 
doctrine, but years of disuse have made it a functional nullity.140  It is 
                                                                                                             
way for some cases brought under the Guarantee Clause to be justiciable.  505 U.S. 144, 186 
(1992). 
136 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (holding that Missouri’s mandatory retirement requirement 
for judges does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).  The Court 
said that a federal law will only be applicable to important state government activities if 
Congress makes clear that it intended such.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 323 (3d 2006) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. 
137 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted). 
138 New York, 505 U.S. at 185–86. 
139 Id.  The Tenth Amendment holds that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Court similarly used the Tenth 
Amendment in the case Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935–36 (1997) (holding that 
under the Tenth Amendment, Congress cannot utilize state executive officers for its own 
purposes).  Subsequently, the Court heard Reno v. Condon in which it upheld a federal law 
in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge.  528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).  The Court 
distinguished this case from New York and Printz because the law in question, the Drivers 
Privacy Protection Act, was a “prohibition of conduct, not an affirmative mandate.”  
PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 325–26.  This case follows Tenth Amendment jurisprudence 
established in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), a case 
that has never been overruled.  Id. at 322, 326. 
140 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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possible that a challenge to NPV legislation may arouse this “sleeping 
giant,” a possibility that is contextually explored in the following 
analysis.141 
III.  ANALYSIS 
If enough states legislatively adopt the NPV, the Supreme Court will 
face the unique challenge of having to reconcile two previously 
unassociated constitutional provisions.142  These two constitutional 
provisions, immediately at play when enough states have adopted the 
NPV, are Article II, section 1, pararagraph 2, and the Compact Clause.143  
Within that context, this Analysis demonstrates that the text of Article II 
in an unsophisticated and very blunt way eschews federal 
interference.144  Before proffering an exposition of congressional 
impotence in determining how states choose their electors, this Part 
concludes that while policy arguments have no bearing on the legal 
arguments at play, when considered, policy rationale supports the 
NPV.145  Specifically, this Analysis will examine, as a policy argument, 
the single caveat to state plenary power—the notion of equal protection 
(a principle that is constitutionally precluded by Article II from being 
fully applied by the federal government to the presidential election) and 
conclude that a paradox antithetical to the moving spirit behind and 
within the Constitution would arise by federal interference with states 
wishing to enable one person one vote through the NPV.146  Finally, this 
Analysis will consider the possibility that the Court will modify current 
Compact Clause jurisprudence in a way that the NPV could face 
heightened scrutiny.147  With this backdrop, the Contribution tackles the 
question of the Guarantee Clause’s viability for settling the differences 
between Article II, section 1 and the Compact Clause.148 
                                                 
141 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 290. 
142 See Muller, supra note 90, at 390 (discussing that there has never been an interstate 
compact regarding presidential elections because they are governed by Article II, section 1). 
143 Id. 
144 See infra Part III.A (discussing the same). 
145 See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the same). 
146 See infra Part III.C (discussing the same).  In other words, one person, one vote cannot 
be implemented and enforced by the federal government in an interstate manner; only 
within each state is one person, one vote applicable.  Id. 
147 See infra Part III.D (discussing the same). 
148 See infra Part IV (discussing the same). 
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A. Article II, Section 1 Gives the States Complete, Unqualified, Absolute, and 
Full Plenary Power 
If James Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention are 
accurate, there was no debate about how state legislatures would 
appoint electors.149  Instead of giving the states policy guidelines or a 
rationale to consider or follow, the Framers elected to give the states a 
power through which state legislatures could exercise their own 
discretion.150  The lack of guidelines in Article II’s grant of power to the 
state legislatures and the derivative flexibility bestowed as a 
consequence have borne the test of time rather well despite many efforts 
to change it; the presidential election process has only been amended 
once with passage of the Twelfth Amendment.151  The Twelfth 
                                                 
149 PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 45.  The Framers did not debate whether state legislatures 
“would appoint the electors themselves, require that they be chosen by popular vote in 
districts, or provide for popular vote statewide.”  Id.  Further, the Framers did not even 
debate the real role of electors.  Id.  The biggest debate at the convention about presidential 
elections concerned the contingency plan.  Id. at 47.  Initially, the Senate was to choose the 
president if no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, but some delegates 
feared the power that this would give to the Senate whose members were then chosen by 
state legislators.  Id. at 48. 
150 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28 (1892).  Regarding this power, Chief Justice 
Fuller said: 
The Journal of the Convention discloses that propositions that the 
President should be elected by “the citizens of the United States,” or by 
the “people,” or “by electors to be chosen by the people of the several 
states,” instead of by the Congress, were voted down, as was the 
proposition that the President should be “chosen by electors appointed 
for that purpose by the legislatures of the States,” . . . . The final result 
seems to have reconciled contrariety of views by leaving it to the state 
legislatures to appoint directly by joint ballot or concurrent separate 
action, or through popular election by districts or by general ticket, or 
as otherwise might be directed. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
151 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also supra text accompanying note 44 (explaining that ten 
percent of all proposed amendments are for Electoral College reform); supra note 45 
(explaining the passage of the Twelfth Amendment).  With passage of the Twelfth 
Amendment, “any semblance” of electors acting as independent agents disappeared, but 
not their constitutional prerogative to act independently.  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 121.  The 
fact that the Electoral College has been so adaptable despite changes in how states choose 
electors is a point often made by proponents of the Electoral College.  BENNETT, supra note 
28, at 58; see also, e.g., Martin Diamond, The Electoral College and the American Idea of 
Conspiracy, in AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE:  A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 44, 46 (rev. 
ed., Walter Berns ed., 1992) (“Not only is [the electoral college] not at all archaic, but one 
might say that it is the very model of up-to-date constitutional flexibility.  Perhaps no other 
feature of the Constitution has had a greater capacity for dynamic historical 
adaptiveness.”); George Will, Forward to ROSS, supra note 42, at x (“And today’s electoral-
vote system is not an 18th-century anachronism.  It has evolved, shaping and being shaped 
by a large development the Constitution’s Framers did not foresee—the two party 
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Amendment did nothing to change the role of electors or the role of state 
legislatures in choosing those electors, despite evidence that electors 
were not acting independently as had been hoped for by some of the 
Framers.152 
The opinion in Bush v. Gore reiterates the long-standing plenary 
principle of Article II that is unequivocally accepted by the Court.153  
While custom may have changed the electoral process from what the 
Framers had personally envisioned to popular statewide winner-take-all 
elections for electors that may have removed all discretion from electors 
and turned the presidential election from a process of wise deliberations 
into popular pageantry, custom alone does not have a force capable of 
overriding the Constitution:  “The State, of course, after granting the 
franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to 
appoint electors.”154 
                                                                                                             
system.”). 
 The only other significant change to the electoral-vote process was The Electoral 
Count Act of 1887, which provided for a more efficient transmission of electoral votes by a 
state’s chief election officer to Congress and which laid out rules for Congress regarding 
how to count the electoral votes; again, there was no change in how states can choose their 
electors.  BENNETT, supra note 28, at 36–37, 116. 
152 See supra note 45 (explaining the passage of the Twelfth Amendment).  In Federalist 
No. 68, Alexander Hamilton, in arguing for adoption of the new constitution, pointed to 
the desirability of the immediate election of the president by “men most capable of 
analizing [sic] the qualities adapted to the station [of president].” THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 
(Alexander Hamilton).  He reasoned that, “[a] small number of persons, . . . will be most 
likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an 
investigation.”  Id.  By the third election, however, electors were already voting along party 
lines.  BENNETT, supra note 28, at 23–24.  By the time of the passage of the Twelfth 
Amendment, it was evident that “rather than exercising any real discretion informed by 
discussion among electors,” electors were instead “often” casting votes in accordance with 
prior commitments.  Id. at 23.  Even in the first presidential election, Massachusetts electors 
cast ballots pursuant to a predetermined vote.  “[T]hey had not come to discuss, deliberate 
and negotiate.”  Id. at 201 n.61 (quoting TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH 
AMENDMENT 31 (1994)).  Today, “the voting of the electors is a formality, predetermined by 
the popular vote cast in each state on [election day].”  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL 
CRISIS:  THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 3 (2004). 
153 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).  “Whether the electoral college and winner-take-all casting of 
electoral votes is a good idea or not has no bearing on the law.  Article II, section 1 and the 
Twelfth Amendment are the Constitution we have.”  Porter v. Bowen, 518 F.3d 1181, 1183–
84 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting). 
154 Bush, 531 U.S at 104.  The Court explained that state legislators used to choose the 
electors but “[h]istory has now favored the voter.”  Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 
345 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the benefit of the Electoral College is the process of 
wise deliberations).  Some Framers feared popular elections; among the rationale for not 
codifying a popular national election in the Constitution, there was a fear of the ignorance 
of the American people at large, of how easily they could be manipulated by, for instance, 
the Order of the Cincinnati.  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 42. 
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There is nothing ambiguous about the plenary power given to state 
legislatures and there is no sophisticated argument to make concerning 
this power beyond the fact that they have full power.155  State 
legislatures can choose any agent as the means of selecting state 
electors.156  Literally any method within the scope of federal equal 
protection law can be chosen by state legislatures; governors could be 
designated to choose electors, a state’s supreme court could be given the 
honor, or even a game of chance might be drawn up—chimps could be 
given darts and a board of nominees covered with the pictures of 
potential electors.157  That there is currently no great variety in the 
methods used by state legislators to choose electors—popular elections 
are used in every state—merely supports the proposition that state 
legislators are self-interested individuals belonging to political parties 
comprised of interests and agendas.158  Legislators are politicians who 
want to stay in office and who will maintain popular voting because they 
are ultimately accountable to the people.159  Ruling political parties will 
maintain the winner-take-all system out of a sense of “political self-
preservation.”160 
                                                 
155 See supra text accompanying note 57 (stating that state legislatures have plenary 
power when choosing electors). 
156 See supra text accompanying note 57 (noting that the state legislature has plenary 
power when choosing its electors). 
157 See, e.g., KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 38 (quoting the Colorado Constitution, which 
guarantees the right of the people to vote for presidential electors). State constitutions, 
however, may limit or preclude some, any, or all of these methods.  McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892). 
158 PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 77.  Peirce posits two reasons for the prevalence of a popular 
vote under a general ticket system.  Id.  First, over time, American sentiment has favored 
direct participation where the people, rather than state legislatures, would have the 
privilege of choosing presidential electors.  Id.  Secondly, the general ticket system favored 
the ruling political class by allowing them to secure all the state’s electoral votes for the 
national candidate in consideration for power, prestige, and patronage.  Id.  On the other 
hand, minority interests in the state legislature preferred a district system to protect their 
voice in the process, but were impotent to implement such a plan.  Id.; see also, e.g., supra 
notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the general ticket or winner-take-all 
system); infra note 172 (introducing Thomas Jefferson’s argument that choosing electors by 
district would be best only when all states choose this method). 
159 See PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 77 (explaining that the advancement of democratic ideals in 
the general populace means that state legislators elected by the populace have to allow for 
the popular vote in presidential elections). 
160 Id. at 78.  It has been noted that Maine and Nebraska do in fact utilize the district 
system.  Supra text accompanying note 47.  “In all 13 presidential elections in which the 
district system has been used by Maine and Nebraska, the presidential candidate carrying 
the state has carried all of the state’s congressional districts.”  KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 
7 n.17.  Maine and Nebraska have respectively only two and three districts, which is to say 
that they are small.  Id.  Being small, they are more easily dominated by a single party, 
which makes their district system the functional equivalent of a winner-take-all system.  Id. 
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Bush v. Gore illustrated the power of the legislature to appoint 
Florida’s electors.161  According to the Court, so great was the power 
granted to the state legislature for exercising its Article II task, not even 
the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida constitution 
could take away the power of the legislature.162  If Justice Stevens’ 
dissenting interpretation prevailed, it would not be the Florida 
legislature that has full authority in Electoral College matters, but the 
State of Florida as defined by Florida’s constitution.163  Either the Florida 
legislature has plenary power or Florida’s legislature is constrained only 
by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida 
Constitution; either way, Congress does not have the power to interfere 
in this process because it is the State of Florida that has ultimate 
authority in exercising its Article II prerogative.164 
Florida’s ultimate authority in this arena is tempered by only one 
mainstay of the American justice system:  equal protection.165  But equal 
protection and one person, one vote is foreclosed from being fully 
employed in the presidential election process by the federal government 
because of Article II, which means invoking equal protection is 
tantamount to making a policy argument, not a legal argument.166  The 
next Part discusses what bearing, if any, policy arguments should have 
on state adoption of the NPV. 
B. Policy Arguments Have No Bearing on the Constitutional Exercise by 
State Legislatures of Their Plenary Power, However Comma . . . 
Another way of saying that states have plenary power regarding the 
Electoral College is to say that fairness is of no consequence, legal 
policies do not matter, and the original intent of our Founders does not 
necessarily carry much weight.167  For example, a consequence of the 
winner-take-all system is that states do not choose to appoint electors in 
a way favorable to many Founders’ opinions of what constituted 
republican government.168  Madison wrote that “the district system was 
                                                 
161 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 123 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 66–67 (explicating the difference between policy 
and power, and the fact that states have the power when choosing electors regardless of 
policy considerations). 
165 See infra Part III.C (discussing equal protection as it pertains to voting). 
166 See infra Part III.C (providing a discussion of equal protection as it pertains to voting). 
167 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing the same); infra note 172 
(highlighting how Thomas Jefferson’s conception of how the Electoral College should work 
does not match the reality of how it does in fact work). 
168 PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 76. 
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mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was framed 
and adopted.”169  This view was personally supported by such 
constitutional architects as Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton.170  
Politicians themselves, the Framers had a difficult time agreeing on a 
system that could withstand corruption, but they thought they had 
settled on something worthy of the task; Alexander Hamilton 
proclaimed that corruption in the presidential election process would be 
impossible due in large part to the “transient existence” of the electors.171 
Despite their beliefs that the Electoral College foreclosed corruption 
and that the district system was best, Jefferson and Madison both 
adopted a Machiavellian approach to Virginia’s electoral votes in order 
to vanquish their political foes.172  Jefferson and Madison, while not 
favoring the role politics and the emerging two parties were playing in 
the appointment of electors, recognized that a state’s interest would be 
emasculated by adhering to the district system in the face of other states 
using the less democratic winner-take-all system.173  They maneuvered to 
change Virginia’s system temporarily, believing that a constitutional 
amendment giving uniformity to the presidential elector process would 
pass sooner than later.174  The tenor of these comments, that the Electoral 
College does not produce results consistent with higher ideals but must 
be accepted until there is a constitutional amendment, has played out 
through America’s history.175  Of particular concern has been the 
                                                 
169 Id. (quoting James Madison). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 52.  The most frequently cited argument in favor of the Electoral College during 
the ratification debates was that it would prevent “heats and ferments . . . tumult and 
disorder . . . cabal, intrigue and corruption.”  Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton).  For 
example, the President was not to be chosen by Congress—an idea approved four separate 
times during the Convention—because of the fear of “a temptation on the side of the 
executive to intrigue with the legislature for a reappointment.”  Id. at 33, 39–40.  Those 
favoring executive independence did not want the president to be the mere instrument of 
Congress.  Id. at 40.  Further, if Congress chose the president, foreign powers would more 
easily intrigue and hold sway over American politics.  Id. 
172 Id. at 66.  Jefferson said, “[a]ll agree that an election by districts would be best if it 
could be general, but while ten states choose either by their legislatures or by a general 
ticket, it is folly or worse for the other six not to follow.”  Id.  Jefferson wrote this in 
connection to Madison’s bill to change the Virginia electoral system where Federalists had 
made inroads.  Id. 
173 Id. at 66. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., New v. Pelosi, No. 08 Civ. 9055(AKH), 2008 WL 4755414 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 
2008) (“Whatever the merits, Plaintiff's remedy lies in the constitutional amendment 
process, not the courts.”); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1892) (holding that 
Michigan’s legislature could change Michigan’s presidential electoral process regardless of 
any political motivations underlying the decision); see also supra note 45 (highlighting the 
problems of the House contingency plan and the faithless elector). 
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influence that states, by the methods they utilize to choose their electors, 
have on other states desiring to use alternative methods for choosing 
electors.176  Justice Story addressed this in observing, “it has been 
thought desirable by many statesmen to have the Constitution amended 
so as to provide for a uniform mode of choice by the people.”177 
As a consequence, any and all non-constitutional arguments against 
the NPV, i.e. any and all policy arguments against the NPV, are non-
sequiturs.178  However, policy arguments against the NPV cannot be 
completely ignored.  One argument posits that the NPV could allow 
eleven states acting in concert to determine the President.179  This 
argument presumes the NPV is contrary to the interests of small states 
and that the Electoral College as it now operates helps to protect those 
interests.180  However, with the small state of Hawaii (four electoral 
votes), as well as Maryland (ten votes), having already ratified the NPV, 
the plan will now require at the bare minimum thirteen states as of this 
writing before it can take effect.181  A student Note in the Harvard Law 
Review amply demonstrates that the nearly ubiquitous winner-take-all 
system does not clearly benefit small or large states.182  On the contrary, 
the Electoral College already allows for the far-out possibility that a mere 
twenty-seven percent of the population could determine the next 
President.183 
Another policy argument against the NPV is that using the 
constitutional amendment process would be more democratic.184  This 
would produce a permanent change and would ultimately be more 
                                                 
176 See PEIRCE supra note 2, at 132. 
177 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33 (quoting Justice Story). 
178 See supra notes 57–67 (explaining the plenary power inherent to state legislators 
regarding presidential elector appointments). 
179 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 380 (citing Tara Ross’ critique that “11 colluding 
states” could impose the NPV on the country). 
180 Top National Popular Vote (Koza) Myths:  Top Six Myths Upon Which the Koza Scheme Is 
Based, THE AMY OLIVER SHOW (Mar. 26, 2009), http://blog.amyolivershow.com/top-
national-popular-vote-koza-myths/; Bob Williams, In Defense of the Electoral College:  The 
National Popular Vote Movement Threatens a Vital Part of Our Republic, ALEC POLICY FORUM, 
http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/Electoral_College_Defense.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). 
181 See supra note 73 (delineating the states who have adopted the NPV); 2008 Presidential 
Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-
college/2008/election-results.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (providing data on the 
popular and electoral vote in 2008). 
182 See Rethinking the Electoral College Debate, supra note 44, at 2526 (using statistics to 
clearly demonstrate that the winner-take-all system does not benefit large states or small 
states). 
183 Id. at 2532.  Alternatively, the eleven biggest states, home to fifty-six percent of the 
population, could theoretically determine the President under the current regime.  KOZA ET 
AL., supra note 17, at 380. 
184 KOZA ET AL., supra note 17, at 379. 
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damaging to the Electoral College because it would be legislation 
binding on all states, whereas adoption of the NPV is within the 
discretion of each individual state.185  Yet another argument suggests 
that the NPV would work against our two-party system.186  Although the 
wisdom of a two-party system is debatable, it is not something that is 
constitutionally prescribed.187 
There are practical concerns regarding the NPV.188  These include 
that the NPV would result in recount chaos, which would prolong the 
resolution of a presidential election.189  Also, only big urban centers 
would matter, candidates would campaign only in media markets, and 
campaign spending would skyrocket.190  These are all worthy concerns, 
and as of now, unknowns. 
While there is no precedent allowing for either Congress or the 
Supreme Court to invalidate the NPV through policy considerations, 
policy arguments certainly have a role in influencing state legislators 
who may have to vote for or against the NPV.  Assuming that some of 
these problems would really manifest themselves, they then become 
logistical concerns that should be weighed against policy rationale in 
support of the NPV.  There is one over-arching policy rationale in favor 
of the NPV—equal protection, which is discussed next.191 
C. Equal Protection Is in All Instances but One a Legal Argument, and Thus a 
Strong Policy Argument 
There is one and only one caveat to the specific plenary power 
reserved for the states in Article II, section 1, regarding elections, a 
limitation which has been described by the Court in the following way: 
“When a State exercises power wholly within the 
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal 
judicial review.  But such insulation is not carried over 
when state power is used as an instrument for 
circumventing a federally protected right.”  The 
conception of political equality from the Declaration of 
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
                                                 
185 Id. at 381. 
186 Broder, supra note 87. 
187 See generally U.S. CONST. (stating nowhere the constitutional requirement of a two-
party system). 
188 See infra text accompanying notes 189–90 (discussing the same). 
189 Williams, supra note 180. 
190 Id. 
191 See infra Part III.C (discussing the same). 
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Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments 
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.192 
In the instance of voting, federally protected rights have been almost 
exclusively concerned with equal protection.193  The only constitutional 
duty owed by a state legislature when designating the people as its agent 
to choose its presidential electors is that of extending equal protection to 
those voters of its own state.194 
To say that equal protection is the only constitutional duty a state 
has when implementing popular voting procedures is also to say that 
equal protection is extremely important in our modern understanding of 
representative democracy—it is the only exception to state power in this 
arena.195  The equal protection now currently afforded voters has not 
always existed.196  Time and forces have changed our understanding of 
                                                 
192 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 
347 (1960)). 
193 See Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE:  C.R. DIVISION, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).  Other 
laws enforced address voter registration when citizens obtain drivers licenses, voter 
registration for overseas citizens, and minimum standards for voting.  The Statutes We 
Enforce, UNITED STATES DEP’T JUSTICE, C.R. DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/ 
overview.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).  The Federal Election Commission handles 
campaign finance laws.  Administering and Enforcing Campaign Finance Laws, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). 
194 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000).  Also included in equal protection, i.e. non-
discrimination, is the freedom of association for minority parties, a right guaranteed under 
the First Amendment. See King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670, 675 (D. Del. 1971) (articulating 
that the right to vote can be burdened by undue burdens being placed upon political 
parties seeking to register presidential elector candidates); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 68–71 (highlighting the importance of equal protection in presidential elections). 
195 See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (articulating the same). 
196 See supra notes 70–71 (listing amendments that guarantee equal protection, which had 
theretofore been unprotected).  Voting at the time of the revolution was determined by 
property ownership; each state had different requirements for how much value/net yield 
the land was required to have.  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 37.  Some states required a certain 
amount of taxes to be paid.  Id.  Vermont was the first state to allow all adult males to vote 
in 1791—some time before the Constitution mandated such with passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870.  Id.  Meanwhile, all adult women could vote in Wyoming as early as 
1869—sixty-one years before passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.  State Suffrage Laws, 
LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/suffrage. 
html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (providing a .jpg version of “An Act to Grant the Women of 
Wyoming Territory the Right of Suffrage, and to Hold Office,” which was approved on 
December 10, 1869).  States, having the power to choose qualifications for the franchise in 
state elections, were also given the same power in choosing qualifications for those who 
would vote for House Representatives.  PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 38.  So, for example, all 
adult males in Vermont would vote for Representatives in the House (the state legislator 
chose the state’s Senators), while only males owning property would vote for 
Representatives from Virginia.  Id. 
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equality and the franchise so that the Court can conclude that “the 
philosophy behind the electoral college . . . . belongs to a bygone day.”197  
The effective result is that the Electoral College is an exception to the 
exception, a caveat to the caveat; the Court will not hear equal protection 
challenges to the Electoral College from individuals or small states or 
anybody.198  This is because the fundamental principle of equal 
                                                 
197 Gray, 372 U.S. at 379 n.8. 
198 See e.g., New v. Pelosi, No. 08 Civ. 9055(AKH), 2008 WL 4755414 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 
2008) (dismissing summarily plaintiff’s civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the Electoral 
College diluted the votes of citizens of big states and the votes of women).  The pro se 
plaintiff presented a sophisticated argument as conceded by the court’s opinion: 
Plaintiff argues that the electoral college process created by Article II, 
Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution favors states 
with smaller populations by granting to their citizens greater 
influence, per electoral vote, on the outcome of presidential elections 
than it grants to citizens of larger states.  For example, by dividing 
South Dakota’s number of electoral votes (3) by its 2000 census 
population (rounded to 755,000), Plaintiff asserts that a South 
Dakotan’s vote has a “value” of 0.0000039, while a New Yorker's vote, 
by similar calculation, has a “value” of 0.0000017.  Plaintiff then groups 
the states into three regions (“Northern/Western liberal/moderate 
states,” “Farm/Great Plains states,” and “Southern conservative 
states”), calculates the average “value” of votes cast in each region, and 
concludes that the two more politically conservative regions wield a 
“leveraged advantage” in voting power over the “Northern/Western 
liberal/moderate states.”  Plaintiff argues that the electoral college, by 
creating this advantage, violates the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments because it derives from a constitutional bargain to 
benefit Southern, slaveholding states.  Plaintiff further argues that the 
electoral college violates the Nineteenth Amendment because, in 
penalizing states that tend to vote for Democratic candidates, it 
disfavors the voting power of women, who tend to vote Democratic.  
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order that restrains the 
Congress from counting electoral college votes pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 1 
et seq. and instead mandates a national popular vote.  Because all of 
Plaintiff’s claims rest on the existence and effects of mathematical vote 
dilution, I interpret the complaint to allege that the electoral college 
violates the “one person, one vote” principle of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . . 
Id. 
 In 1966, in Delaware v. New York, twelve small states brought a suit against the other 
thirty-seven states claiming that the winner-take-all method violated the Equal Protection 
clause.  Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint and Brief, ¶ XX 385 U.S. 895 (1966) 
(No. 28, Original), 1966 WL 100407.  The attorney general for Delaware made sophisticated 
arguments, two of which were contained in paragraphs six and seven of the complaint: 
6. In its actual functioning the state unit system of electing the 
President and Vice President is part of an integrated national process.  
The interlocking and interdependent features of this national electoral 
system cause each state's methods to be affected by all others and give 
each state and its citizens a real interest in the electoral methods of 
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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the Court 
has extended protection, does not give the Court power to strike out any 
other part of the Constitution, including Article II, section 1.199 
If the NPV were successfully challenged in the Supreme Court under 
the Compact Clause and if Congress chose not to give its consent, this 
would put state legislatures that adopt the NPV in a unique position; 
these states would be constitutionally mandated to implement one 
person, one vote for all local elections while simultaneously being 
prohibited from individually deciding to act in unison to embrace one 
person, one vote.200  This is a paradox ultimately antithetical to the spirit 
of the Constitution.  The majority of amendments to the Post Bill of 
Rights Constitution were enacted by the impetus of equal protection.201  
Courts have correctly foreclosed equal protection challenges by 
individuals regarding the presidential vote.202  And yet by requiring 
congressional approval for the NPV, the spirit of equality so prevalent in 
the Constitution would fall prey to the gravity of a legal void where 
                                                                                                             
every state.  Each state's electoral votes and each individual's popular 
vote are subject to impairment, debasement, and dilution by the 
methods and procedures of other states. 
7. In every election the state unit system abridges the political rights 
of substantial numbers of persons by arbitrarily awarding all of the 
electoral votes of their state to the candidate receiving a bare plurality 
of its popular votes.  This occurs without regard to the number of votes 
cast for an opponent.  435 of the total of 538 electoral votes correspond 
to Representatives and are allocated to states because of their numbers 
of persons.  Nonetheless, the state unit system frequently allows all of 
a state’s votes to be cast for a candidate opposed by as many as 49% of 
its voters.  Votes cast for the losing candidate within a particular state 
are not only discarded at an intermediate stage of the elective process 
but are effectively treated as if they had been cast for an opponent.  
The barest popular vote plurality and the overwhelming landslide are 
converted alike into a unanimous state vote in the national election.  
This arbitrary misappropriation of the elective power of substantial 
political minorities denies them due process of law and equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at *7–8. 
199 See New, 2008 WL 4755414 at *1 (summarily dismissing plaintiff’s complaint based 
upon Fourteenth Amendment claim that the electoral college violated plaintiff’s equal 
protection rights). 
200 See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text (discussing the same). 
201 See supra notes 70–71 (listing the Amendments that relate to equal protection and the 
right to vote). 
202 See, e.g., New, 2008 WL 4755414 (summarily dismissing plaintiff’s complaint based 
upon the Fourteenth Amendment claim that the electoral college violated plaintiff’s equal 
protection rights). 
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nothing short of a constitutional amendment would permit states to fully 
implement equal protection.203 
Allowing only one avenue—the constitutional amendment process—
for full implementation of one person, one vote is a constraint on the 
sovereignty of individual states.204  Equal protection is in all cases but 
this one a legal argument; here it is a policy argument.  But, considering 
the legal force equal protection has in all other franchise realms and that 
equal protection is only foreclosed by Article II and nothing else, it is a 
very strong policy argument in favor of allowing states to enact the 
NPV.205  Poignantly, representative democracy is severely discredited 
when state legislators are no longer accountable to their constituents.206  
In this situation, the federal government would transgress its 
constitutional confines by infringing on state sovereignty all the while 
acting to contravene the premise that all men and women are born 
equal.207 
Not all arguments against the NPV are policy arguments.208  One 
argument, the challenge of the Compact Clause, is explicitly 
constitutional; another argument implicates the overall nature of the 
Constitution by claiming that the NPV threatens the federalism inherent 
therein.209  There have never been interstate agreements involving the 
Electoral College, nor has the Compact Clause ever been applied to 
issues involving this Article II power.210  Thus, the NPV and a challenge 
to it via the Compact Clause would be unprecedented in Supreme Court 
                                                 
203 See Broder, supra note 87 (arguing that the NPV is an end run around the 
constitutional amendment process).  It logically follows that if the NPV is held to be 
unconstitutional, there are no other means of fully implementing one person, one vote 
outside the amendment process. 
204 C.f. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (iterating that when the federal 
government compels states to regulate, the accountability of elected state representatives is 
diminished). 
205 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; c.f. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (holding that 
the superficial resemblance between state apportionment plans and the legislative 
representation scheme of the Federal Congress affords no proper basis for sustaining that 
plan, since the historical circumstances which gave rise to the congressional system of 
representation, arising out of compromise among sovereign States, are unique and without 
relevance to the allocation of seats in state legislatures). 
206 See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (arguing the same). 
207 Cf. id.; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 587 (holding that weighting votes differently according to 
where citizens happen to reside is discriminatory). 
208 E.g., Muller, supra note 90 (discussing the Compact Clause). 
209 See Broder, supra note 87 (arguing that the NPV ignores the fundamental 
characteristics of American government:  federalism and the two party system); Muller, 
supra note 90 (concluding that the NPV violates the Compact Clause).  One author posits 
that the Guarantee Clause actually guarantees a federally elected President.  Feeley, supra 
note 108, at 1428. 
210 Supra text accompanying notes 99–101. 
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history.211  The next Part of this Note addresses how these two 
constitutional clauses, potentially colliding for the first time, measure up 
to each other. 
D. The Compact Clause v. Article II 
In one corner, there is the Article II plenary power of the states 
establishing the Electoral College.212  This constitutional provision is 
limited by the principle of equal protection, but only for locally held 
popular elections.213  The states are not required to hold popular 
elections for presidential electors.214  The states can designate any 
method for determining who its presidential electors will be.215  No state 
has ever designated the American people at large to choose its 
presidential electors, but there is no Supreme Court precedent 
prohibiting states from deciding to choose the American people at large 
for this constitutionally mandated task.216 
In the other corner, there is the Compact Clause.217  Under current 
Compact Clause jurisprudence, the Court looks primarily to actual, not 
possible, encroachment on federal sovereignty by compacting states.218  
The Court has also said that non-compacting states may suffer 
detrimental secondary effects without the Compact Clause necessarily 
being violated.219  As Compact Clause jurisprudence now stands, it 
seems likely that the NPV would be held constitutional in spite of any 
Compact Clause challenge because the NPV does not encroach on the 
power of the federal government.220 
If the Court decided to apply a horizontal analysis to determine 
whether the NPV infringes upon the sovereignty of non-compacting 
states, it would likely find that non-compacting states still retain the 
                                                 
211 See supra note 101 (logically stipulating that in the absence of prior compacts 
regarding elections, a Compact Clause challenge to NPV would be an issue of first 
impression for the Court). 
212 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
213 See supra Part III.C (exploring the principle of equal protection as it applies to the 
Article II plenary power of the states). 
214 See supra Part III.A (discussing the flexibility state legislatures have in deciding how to 
choose presidential electors). 
215 See supra Part III.A (describing the broad power possessed by the state legislature). 
216 See supra Part III.A (noting the broad authority state legislatures maintain over 
selecting presidential electors). 
217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
218 Supra text accompanying note 96. 
219 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S 452, 477 (1978). 
220 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, par. 2 (giving to state legislatures the power to choose 
presidential electors). 
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ability to choose presidential electors in whichever manner they desire.221  
That these non-compacting states might suffer secondary effects would 
not necessarily suffice to invalidate the NPV.222  The Constitution 
guarantees to the states the power to choose presidential electors, but it 
does not guarantee that a state’s presidential electors will have their 
candidate elected President.223 
Regardless of this initial analysis, Congress could attempt to 
interfere by passing a resolution against the NPV, or a state could ask the 
Court to invalidate the NPV under a modified Compact Clause 
jurisprudence because there is no congressional consent.224  Congress or 
the Court might determine that the secondary effects bearing on non-
compacting states are egregious enough to seriously consider a Compact 
                                                 
221 See supra Part II.B (discussing the NPV which is not legislation requiring action of non-
compacting states). 
222 Supra text accompanying note 103.  Even a horizontal analysis that looks to how such 
an agreement affects non-member states could not pass muster.  See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S 
at 477 (stating that the risk of unfairness is independent of the nature and legitimacy of the 
compact in question).  Non-member state presidential electors who cast their votes contrary 
to the national popular vote would merely be in the minority, but that does not mean their 
votes would not be counted; it only means that they would lose.  See Hendricks, supra note 
90, at 226.  State legislatures do not need the NPV to choose the national popular vote as the 
method for appointing presidential electors; the NPV does not give states a power they do 
not already have, it only provides a litmus test by which to gauge when a state can appoint 
presidential electors without potentially nullifying any or all of its political clout.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (giving to states the power to appoint presidential electors).  That 
there is pressure upon non-member states is decisive of nothing when it comes to a 
constitutional analysis.  Hendricks, supra note 90, at 224; c.f. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate 
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978).  The Supreme Court stated the following: 
Moreover, it is not explained how any economic pressure that does 
exist is an affront to the sovereignty of nonmember States.  Any time a 
State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the programs 
of a sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result.  Unless 
that pressure transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, it is not clear how our 
federal structure is implicated.  Appellants do not argue that an 
individual State’s decision to apportion nonbusiness income—or to 
define business income broadly, as the regulations of the Commission 
actually do—touches upon constitutional strictures.  This being so, we 
are not persuaded that the same decision becomes a threat to the 
sovereignty of other States if a member State makes this decision upon 
the Commission’s recommendation. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Thus, it follows that unless the pressure on non-member states 
transgresses some other constitutional bounds, there is no cause of action. 
223 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2 (giving state legislatures the power to choose 
presidential electors). 
224 Schleifer, supra note 90, at 749.  The NPV could be the straw that breaks the camel’s 
back, the camel being current Compact Clause jurisprudence.  Id. 
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Clause challenge.225  Thus, if Compact Clause jurisprudence is revised, 
the Compact and Guarantee Clauses might appear more evenly 
matched. 
It is certain that if Congress tried to interfere with state legislative 
adoption of the NPV, there would be a Tenth Amendment argument, as 
set out in New York v. United States, that Congress cannot compel states to 
legislate in a certain manner.226  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court had 
recourse to the Tenth Amendment.227  The Tenth Amendment was also 
invoked in New York v. United States and again in Printz v. United 
States.228  Many federalism cases, if not most, involve the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.229  
However, Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is both erratic and beyond 
the scope of this Note.230 
While it is true that if the Court relied on the Tenth Amendment to 
find the NPV constitutional, there would be no need to look any further, 
nothing regarding the Tenth Amendment can be so certain.231  If the 
Court were asked to invalidate the NPV and Congress had not moved to 
counteract the NPV legislation, then the Tenth Amendment would not 
be an applicable defense for states that have adopted NPV legislation.232  
This is so because there would have been no federal government 
intrusion into any state’s legislative process or commandeering of any 
state’s executive branch.  This Note will leave a more sophisticated Tenth 
                                                 
225 Id. 
226 See Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 877 (arguing that Congress would run into serious 
problems if it acted to command a state to adopt any certain legislation). 
227 501 U.S 452, 452 (1991). 
228 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 935–36 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
229 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005) (holding that provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act, which criminalized the manufacture, distribution, or possession of 
marijuana for interstate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes, does not 
violate the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that 
42 U.S.C. § 13981—a federal civil remedy for victims of gender related violence—cannot 
stand under either the Commerce Clause or section five of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
New York, 505 U.S. at 185–86 (holding that the Commerce Clause precluded a Guarantee 
Clause claim). 
230 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 136, at 312–26 (recounting the history of Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence).  The Court has taken two approaches to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence 
that are inconsistent.  Id. at 313. 
231 See id. at 326 (“[I]t will take many years and further decisions for the Supreme Court 
to clarify the content of the new federalism which has emerged in the past decade.”). 
232 See id. (noting that current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence may allow congressional 
prohibitions on state conduct so long as Congress does not affirmatively mandate state 
action). 
Turflinger: Fifty Republics and the National Popular Vote: How the Guarantee
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
836 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
Amendment analysis for another writer, and instead turn to Article IV’s 
guarantee of republican government.233 
Assuming, once again, the juxtaposition of two evenly matched 
constitutional provisions—Article II, which establishes the Electoral 
College, and the Compact Clause—this Note contends that the 
Guarantee Clause should be the determinative factor, thus ensuring the 
constitutionality of the NPV.234  In recent years the Court has flirted with 
the Guarantee Clause by invoking its name in several cases concerning 
federalism, but the Court’s fidelity to the Tenth Amendment has 
prevented the Court from relying on the Guarantee Clause in any of its 
holdings.235  What exactly would an argument in defense of the 
constitutionality of the NPV pursuant to the Guarantee Clause look like 
if presented before the Supreme Court?  The following Contribution 
outlines such an argument. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The Guarantee Clause has not been employed by the Supreme Court 
in nearly one hundred years.  Thus, it is expected that the Court would 
approach use of the Guarantee Clause with trepidation.  This Part seeks 
to allay such fears.  The Contribution posits that the Guarantee Clause is 
perfectly applicable to the exceptionally unique legal circumstances 
presented by a Compact Clause challenge to states enacting the NPV 
pursuant to their Article II powers.  In concluding that the Guarantee 
Clause should be implicated in a constitutional challenge to state 
legislative adoption of the NPV, the Contribution will evoke the clause’s 
highly relevant historical narrative as a foundation.236  Next, the 
Contribution will offer a policy argument in favor of applying the 
Guarantee Clause in the unique situation explored by this Note pitting 
Article II against the Compact Clause.237  Finally, this Part will conclude 
                                                 
233 See infra Part V. 
234 See infra Part V. 
235 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183–84 (1992) (stating that because a 
provision in question was invalidated under the Tenth Amendment, there was no need for 
the Court to evaluate the same provision in light of the Guarantee Clause); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1991) (discussing the importance for states to determine the 
qualifications of their government officials underneath both the Tenth Amendment and the 
Guarantee Clause); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (“In 
light of the constitutional guarantee to States of a ‘Republican Form of Government,’ U.S. 
Const. Art. IV, § 4, Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to disrupt a State’s 
republican regime.”). 
236 See infra Part IV.A. 
237 See infra Part IV.B. 
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with the legal argument in support of activating this clause, which has 
been inactive for almost a century.238 
A. Important Historical Considerations for the Guarantee Clause 
The Guarantee Clause has been called a “sleeping giant,” but the 
import of the clause was very much awake with meaning over two 
hundred years ago.239  The view that the Guarantee Clause protects 
states from undue interference by Congress is embodied in the 
ratification of the National Constitution.  James Madison remarked that 
the drafters of the Constitution created a draft that was “nothing but a 
dead letter” until the state ratification conventions breathed life and 
validity into it.240  In the state ratification conventions, concerns about 
growing federal power leading to only nominally sovereign states were 
placated by explicit reference to the Guarantee Clause.241 
When this giant was put to sleep, it was for practical and very 
circumstantial, if not far-sighted, reasons and has remained asleep 
because, like any good giant, it is powerful.242  Justice Taney’s 1849 
opinion in Luther has influenced Guarantee Clause jurisprudence to this 
day, thus imbuing some importance into the extra-legal factors framing 
his decision.243  Practical considerations shaped his opinion more than 
“immutable principles embedded in the Constitution[;]” specifically, if 
Justice Taney had ruled otherwise, seven years of government activity 
would have been completely nullified.244 
B. Policy Rationale for Use of the Guarantee Clause in This Unique Situation 
As a sleeping giant, the Guarantee Clause should not be stirred 
recklessly.  However, utilizing the Guarantee Clause to reinforce that 
                                                 
238 See infra Part IV.C. 
239 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 290 (quoting Charles Sumner); see supra note 108 (outlining 
the various causes that have elicited legal support from the Guarantee Clause). 
240 RAKOVE,  supra note 20, at 17. 
241 See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text (discussing concerns by the states about 
growing federal power). 
242 WIECEK, supra note 12, at  295; see also Feeley, supra note 108, at 1436 (listing a variety of 
causes for which the Guarantee Clause has been invoked). 
243 See WIECEK, supra note 12, at 118 (stating that Justice Taney’s rationale has continuing 
pertinence). 
244 Id. at 120.  Taney’s opinion also considered the Domestic Violence clause and the 1792 
Militia Act—an exercise of legislative power—which had given power to the President 
when facing rebellions.  Id. at 85.  Rebellions in 1798, 1832, and 1838 handled by the 
Domestic Violence Act (as articulated through the 1792 Militia Act) gave credence to 
Taney’s use of the Guarantee Clause as derivative of the need to maintain peace and 
tranquility.  Id.; see also Merritt, supra note 108, at 79 (recounting the facts of Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)). 
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which was given exclusively to the states does not open a Pandora’s box.  
No interstate compact has ever dealt with election law and few compacts 
as provocative are visible on the horizon.  There are no floodgates to 
open by use of the Clause in these circumstances. 
While the Court in Luther v. Borden understood “United States” to 
mean “Congress” in striking down a Guarantee Clause challenge so that 
Congress was charged with guaranteeing to states a republican 
government, this is not the same as the contemporary understanding of 
“United States.”245  The “United States” denotes the three co-equal 
branches of government.246  One interpretation of the Guarantee Clause 
provides that it prevents most federal intervention in a state’s affairs.247  
This interpretation works only if the “United States” is thought of as 
three co-equal branches balancing and checking each other.248  Thus, if 
Congress overreached by interfering with the federal scheme—if 
Congress decided to commandeer state officials or attempted to control 
state legislation so as to determine how that state could choose its 
electors, for example a presidential elector—the United States through 
the Supreme Court would be charged with protecting the state’s 
fundamental republican nature.249  If Congress were to successfully 
interfere, then state legislators would no longer be responsive to their 
constituents as required in republican government, but instead to an 
outside agency:  the federal government.250 
Further, even a narrower approach to the Guarantee Clause, one that 
sees it as merely concerned with monarchy and aristocracy, would still 
be implicated by congressional interference with state NPV legislation.  
This is because in a monarchy 
citizens do not get to choose their rulers, power is fixed 
and inherited; in a republican form of government, the 
people ultimately retain sovereignty and choose their 
officeholders.  In other words, the key features of a 
                                                 
245 WIECEK, supra note 12, at 301. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 294. 
248 Id. at 301. 
249 C.f. Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that under the Tenth 
Amendment, the federal government cannot take control of a state’s chief enforcement 
officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot 
legislate for state legislatures). 
250 See Merritt, supra note 108, at 41 (explicating that in republican government, states 
have control over their internal governmental machinery). 
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republican form of government are a right to vote and a 
right to political participation.251 
It could be argued that the two chief political parties in the United 
States have hereditary powers and a stranglehold on the entire political 
process, but nowhere in the National Constitution is there a mandate for 
a two-party political system.252  The only caveat to the otherwise absolute 
plenary power states have regarding holding popular elections—equal 
protection in the political process, as mandated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and subsequent amendments—is perfectly in line with the 
notion that the Guarantee Clause is primarily about the right of the 
individual to political participation.253  It is not states qua states that are 
protected from congressional overreach, but the living, breathing people 
residing in the states.254  Deborah Jones Merritt quips that “the citizens of 
a state cannot operate a republican government, ‘choos[ing] their own 
officials’ and ‘enact[ing] their own laws,’ if their government is beholden 
to Washington.”255  For the Court not to rule would mean that Congress 
or the President is left to enforce and/or interpret the Guarantee Clause.  
However, the “members of Congress [may] have a direct personal 
interest implicated.”256 
It is viable to consider that just as policy considerations carry little 
weight regarding a state’s plenary power to appoint under Article II, 
there is little room for policy considerations about the Guarantee 
Clause’s protection of the independence of state governments.  As 
Merritt has noted, “[t]he only ‘policy determination’ demanded . . . is 
that states should maintain a ‘separate and independent existence.’  That 
policy decision, however, has already been made by the Constitution.”257 
C. The Legal Argument for Use of the Guarantee Clause 
By utilizing Justice O’Connor’s criteria for the Guarantee Clause, 
announced in New York v. United States, application of the clause to the 
conflict between Article II and the Compact Clause will not 
                                                 
251 Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868 (footnote omitted). 
252 See generally U.S. CONST. (indicating nowhere the requirement of a two-party system). 
253 Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868. 
254 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people . . . .”); see also WIECEK, supra note 12, at 301 
(“Most Americans no longer consider the states to be anthropomorphic entities capable of 
having rights or enjoying the benefits of the guarantee [of a republican form of 
government].”). 
255 Merritt, supra note 108, at 25 (quoting in part from THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James 
Madison)). 
256 Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 876. 
257 Merritt, supra note 108, at 76. 
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unnecessarily extend the scope of the clause into dangerous territory.  
Her two-part conjunctive test posited that the federal government 
violates the Guarantee Clause if states lose their ability to set their 
legislative agendas and if state government officials can no longer 
remain accountable to the local electorate.258 
Any interference in a state legislative process by the federal 
government is potentially a violation of a state’s sovereignty and the 
principle of federalism itself, unless the federal government is carrying 
out a constitutionally specified task.259  The very ideal of federalism is 
protected by the plenary power given states in Article II.260  This is 
because Article II is a part of the constitutional scheme, whereby states 
are assured a role in the selection of the executive branch and they are 
insured against Congress overreaching when states exercise their role in 
the election of the executive and the legislative branches of the federal 
government.261  The Court can reinforce this principle by affirming that 
states have control over local elections, a key aspect of republican 
government, and that constitutionally, popular elections for presidential 
electors are local elections.262 
Presidential electors are agents of the states, not of the federal 
government.263  They are officers in fifty distinct representative 
democracies—in republics.  Control over state representatives is an 
essential component of state sovereignty and republican government.264  
                                                 
258 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185–86 (1991). 
259 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549–50 (1985).  In this case, 
the Court adopted the view that “the political process gives the states their primary 
protection against destructive federal intrusions.”  Merritt, supra note 108, at 1. 
260 Merritt, supra note 108, at 1. 
261 Id. at 14–15.  States were given indirect influence over elections for the House.  Id.  
There is nothing indirect about their power over presidential elections.  U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, par. 3. 
262 See Merritt, supra note 108, at 38 (arguing that state control over local elections is 
intrinsic to republican government). 
263 Supra text accompanying note 22. 
264 Merritt, supra note 108, at 36.  Poignantly, 
[c]ontrol over the franchise is a hallmark of republican government.  
Montesquieu observed that “it is as important to regulate in a republic, 
in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what suffrages 
are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince, and 
after what manner he ought to govern.”  James Madison echoed this 
thought, declaring in The Federalist that “[t]he definition of the right of 
suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican 
government.”  In order to establish a government responsive to its 
electorate, a state must first define that electorate.  The power to define 
the franchise for a state and local elections, therefore, is one of the 
powers that the guarantee clause originally reserved to the states. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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The Court has shown extra deference in approaching state authority over 
officers and legislatures.265  Congress cannot legislate for states or take 
command of state officers, two components over which control is 
necessary for a state exercising its Article II power.  Explicitly, the Court 
has said: 
Just as “the Framers of the Constitution intended the 
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth 
Amendment, the power to regulate elections,” [e]ach 
State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its 
officers and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen. . . . [O]fficers who participate directly in 
the . . . execution . . . of broad public policy perform 
functions that go to the heart of representative 
government.266 
As in Coyle v. Smith, a claim based on a congressionally imposed 
limitation upon the power of the state should be actionable under the 
Guarantee Clause.267  If a state loses its ability to set its legislative 
agenda, including adopting principles of equal protection when its 
citizens act in concert with citizens from other states to elect the 
President, and if a state’s government officials can no longer remain 
accountable to the local electorate (i.e., if state representatives are 
impotent to execute the laws passed), and if this situation arises from 
interference by the federal government, then there would be a violation 
of the Guarantee Clause.268  More succinctly stated, a congressional 
                                                 
265 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot 
utilize state officers for its own purposes); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992) (holding that federal legislation cannot be used to commandeer the state legislative 
process). 
266 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); 
see also Merritt, supra note 108, at 50.  “It is obviously essential to the independence of the 
states . . . that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers . . . should be 
exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the 
Constitution of the United States.”  Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71 (1900).  The 
Guarantee Clause does not protect states from federal infringement in determining 
qualifications for all local officials, or even most state employees.  See Merritt, supra note 
108, at 52 (distinguishing a small number of state employees that promote the ends of 
republican government). 
267 See 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911) (holding that Congress could not restrict Oklahoma’s 
placement of its capitol). 
268 See Merritt, supra note 108, at 23 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause protects states 
from federal government interference); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 868 (arguing 
that the Guarantee Clause protects individual liberties).  If Merritt’s proposition that the 
Guarantee Clause protects states from the Federal Government is true and if states attempt 
to extend a policy of equal protection via the NPV, would individuals then have justiciable 
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challenge to the NPV would implicate the Guarantee Clause because 
Article II is power reserved for the states that cuts to the heart of 
republican government. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It has been written by one of its detractors that the National Popular 
Vote is intended to revolutionize the Electoral College.269  But consider 
that “[Thomas] Jefferson said every generation needs its own 
revolution.”270  Revolution need not mean a bloody overthrow of one’s 
government.  “Revolution” can mean “a very important change in the 
way that people do things.”271  Change can occur within a constitutional 
framework.  See, for example, the Eleventh through Twenty-Seventh 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  Change within a constitutional 
framework does not require the amendment process, as demonstrated by 
Marbury v. Madison, Shelly v. Kraemer, Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, or President Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation.272  What the author is contemplating here is Democracy as 
an ongoing experiment, an experiment that requires education, 
measured assessment, and a generation making its constitution its own 
within the flexible framework offered to posterity by the Framers of the 
Constitution.  Strikingly, no revolution is needed in order for the NPV to 
take effect because it operates completely within the framework of the 
Constitution.  It is not the Constitution that would bar the NPV.  There 
are no originalist arguments or policy arguments strong enough to 
prevent Article II from working in unison with the Constitution’s 
guarantee of a republican form of government.  Only a blind adherence 
to custom, fear, or the ill-intentioned self-interest of political incumbents 
and their affiliates could stop the NPV once and if enough states have 
ratified it.  The result of finding the NPV unconstitutional would be a 
pair of absurdities:  first, state legislatures would be barred from fully 
embracing the ideal of equal protection in choosing their electors; and 
second, the only way to protect state sovereignty in the federal system 
                                                                                                             
individual liberty claims against the federal government under Chemerinsky’s conception 
of the Guarantee Clause? 
269 Pincus, supra note 75, at 512. 
270 David Lawsky, History Lessons:  Would Federalists Like Their Fans?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
1995, at 43 (quoting Newt Gingrich). 
271 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, CAMBRIDGE:  DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/revolution_2 (last visited Oct. 23, 
2010). 
272 For more creative changes within the U.S. constitutional framework, see Robert F. 
Blomquist, Thinking About Law and Creativity:  On the 100 Most Creative Moments in American 
Law, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 119 (2008). 
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would be for Congress to legislate for states by mandating that they 
cannot embrace equal protection.  With the NPV and the guarantee of 
state republics, the fiction of a leader of the free people could be made a 
reality. 
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